

IV: Alltagsgeschichte: Day to Day in the Intelligence War

The high level of intelligence activity in Cold War Berlin meant that each side was subjected to constant scrutiny by the other. This not only applied to the kind of so-called "positive" intelligence that might be collected in Berlin--the details of the Western military garrisons, for example, or orders of battle for Soviet military units stationed in East Germany--but also information collected for counterintelligence purposes. Precisely because Berlin was so important as a base for Western intelligence, effective Allied counterintelligence was a vital prerequisite to the collection of the strategic intelligence that was its *raison d'être*. The following documents represent a much larger body of material collected on the Soviet and East German intelligence and security services in Berlin. They presumably would be matched by an equivalent or larger corpus of intelligence reporting collected by the Soviet bloc services on the Western intelligence presence in Berlin.

IV-1: Current Intelligence Weekly Summary (CIWS): The Soviet Establishment in Karlshorst Compound in East Berlin, 7 May 1959 (MORI No. 145728).

This document describes the principal KGB facility in Berlin at the height of the Cold War. The size of the Soviet establishment and the degree to which it was designed to be self-contained contrasts sharply to the Allied presence in West Berlin, where American officers lived in much closer daily contact with the local population.

IV-2: KGB in East Germany, April 1970 (MORI No. 144336).

Although dating from 1970, this report provides details of life in the KGB Rezidentura that probably would be more-or-less equally valid throughout the Cold War. Seemingly trivial details of the kind included in this report often were invaluable for operational purposes.

IV-3: Soviet Intelligence and Security: Lt. Gen. Pitovranov, 23 July 1958 (MORI No. 145209).

Appointed KGB Berlin Rezident in the summer of 1953, Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Petrovich Pitovranov was brought in to "fix things" following the death of Stalin and the uprising of June 1953. He served in Berlin until 1958, when he was replaced by Gen. Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov, a Berlin veteran.¹ This brief bio on Pitovranov gives an indication of the goldfish-bowl-like environment in which many intelligence officers in Berlin lived, despite the aura of secrecy shrouding their profession.

IV-4: Activities of Gen. Ivan A. Serov in Poland, 8 November 1958 (MORI No. 144168).

SMERSH Chief in Soviet-occupied Germany, General Serov arrived with advancing Red Army in the summer of 1945 and left late in 1947, apparently the victim of political machinations in Moscow.² In

1940-41, during the first Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, Serov had been responsible for the deportation of some 134,000 "class enemies" to slave labor camps. A confidant of Nikita Khrushchev, in 1953 Serov engineered the overthrow of Stalin's Internal Security Chief, Lavrenty Beria. In 1954, Serov was made the first chairman of the newly created KGB.

IV-5: IR: Organization of the Soviet Intelligence Organs, 24 February 1955 (MORI No. 144214).

This report provides an overview of the changes in Soviet intelligence that occurred near the end of Stalin's life and during the brief period that Lavrenty Beria was in complete control of Soviet intelligence. Note that, although the "Date of Info." given is December 1952-January 1954, the report was not issued until February 1955, by which time the MGB had been replaced by the KGB.

In December 1952, Stalin created a Chief Directorate of Intelligence (Glavnoye Razovodyvatolnoye Upravleniye--the same name as Soviet military intelligence) over the MGB's First Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) and the Second Directorate (Counter Intelligence) in an effort to insure closer coordination between the two directorates. The change was recommended by Ye. P. Pitovranov, who had been Chief of the MGB's counter-intelligence directorate until his arrest in October 1951. He was released by Stalin in November 1952 and made Chief of the First Directorate (Foreign Intelligence). This arrangement lasted only until Stalin's death and Beria's reorganization of the Soviet intelligence establishment in March 1953. Pitovranov was sent to Berlin as head of the Karlshorst apparat soon after the June 1953 uprising.

IV-6: HVA Meeting Chaired by [Markus] Wolf, 2 February 1953 (MORI No. 145205).

IV-7: HVA Meeting [Sondersitzung] Chaired by [Markus] Wolf, 7 March 1953 (MORI No. 145348).

Western intelligence officers in Germany had to be concerned not only with the Soviet KGB but also with East Germany's highly effective intelligence and security agency, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, also known as the MfS or Stasi. The branch of the Stasi responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence was the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA, usually translated as the Main Administration for Foreign Intelligence), known until 1956 by a cover name, Institut für Wirtschafts-Wissenschaftliche Forschung (IWF, or Institute for Economic Research). For most of the Cold War the IWF/HVA was headed by the enigmatic Markus "Mischa" Wolf. Widely regarded as Moscow's man, Wolf was appointed to head the DDR's foreign intelligence service in late 1952--on the strength of his Soviet connections, according to the Stasi rumor mill.

Document IV-6 is a transcript of a meeting of IWF Department (Abteilung) heads on 2 February 1953. In this, the first meeting he chaired as head of the IWF, Wolf ordered a formal distancing from the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party (SED, or Sozialistische-Einheitspartei Deutschland).

Document IV-7 describes a special meeting held on 7 March 1953, the day after Stalin's death was

announced. Here the principal concern was that the West might somehow exploit the demise of the Soviet leader to mount an assault on the Soviet bloc. The agent reporting on this meeting describes an atmosphere of deep depression in IWF headquarters: "The women personnel appeared in black clothing and behaved as if their own mother had died. The men were similarly affected, but were less demonstrative."

IV-8: Pictures of Mischa Wolf, 9 April 1959 (MORI No. 145204).

IV-9: IR: Markus Johannes Wolf, 11 October 1973 (MORI No. 144083).

Markus Wolf, who became the head of the DDR's foreign intelligence service late in 1952, cloaked himself in anonymity. However, as this first document shows, by 1959 he had been singled out and identified in photographs taken during the 1946 Nürnberg trials. In fact, Western intelligence probably knew as much or more about Markus Wolf than it did about many Eastern Bloc senior intelligence officers, as the second document included here, a brief biography, would suggest. The report is, nonetheless, inaccurate in some of its details. According to Wolf's memoirs, he began work for the IWF when he was recalled to Berlin in August 1951, not in 1952.⁸ Wolf does not mention "Department XV" in his memoirs, but recounts that the IWF was absorbed by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in 1953. In 1956 the IWF cover was dropped and the German foreign intelligence service became the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA).

Wolf was a highly effective intelligence chief and the HVA prospered under his leadership.

IV-10: IR: The Supply and Distribution of Foodstuffs, 3 December 1952 (MORI No. 145223).

IV-11: IR: 1. SED Proposal of Restrictions on Escape from East Germany/ 2. Plants Guards, 5 December 1952 (MORI No. 145224).

IV-12: IR: Establishment of Farm Cooperatives, 10 December 1952 (MORI No. 145225).

IV-13: IR: SED Directives on Refugees... 4 March 1953 (MORI No. 145227).

In the winter of 1952-53, even as Stalin was publicly holding up the prospect of German reunification, the East German regime proceeded with a program of ruthless Sovietization, as these intelligence reports show. At the same time, the DDR moved to tighten controls at the border in a vain effort to halt the flood of refugees. Reporting like this highlights the degree to which the East German regime depended upon diverse organs of control, deeply ramified into German society. It also gives some idea of the difficulties faced by Western intelligence officers in penetrating a highly regimented, tightly controlled police state.

IV-14: Memorandum to the DDI; Subject: Soviet Interference with Berlin Rail Access, 24 November 1956 (MORI No. 6496).

Although the Soviets never again repeated their efforts to isolate Berlin from the outside world, they continued to interfere occasionally with Allied ground transportation. Each incident (such as the one described here) had potentially serious implications for the Allied garrison in Berlin, but Moscow did not allow such small-scale confrontations to escalate into a major crisis.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

7 May 1959

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
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVESTHE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IN KARLSHORST COMPOUND IN EAST BERLIN

The main symbol of the Soviet occupation of Berlin is the Kommandatura--the headquarters of the USSR's Berlin garrison--headed by Maj. Gen. Nikolai Feodorovich Zakharov in the 180-acre Karlshorst compound in East Berlin. Also located there are the headquarters of the Soviet state security organization (KGB), the KGB communications regiment, certain Soviet military intelligence (GRU) units, and housing for all major Soviet units stationed in East Berlin, including elements

of the embassy and trade delegation. The Soviet Embassy itself is not in the compound but is located on Unter den Linden near the Brandenburg Gate. Responsibility for the over-all physical security of the compound is vested in the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS).

Kommandatura

The Kommandatura exercises all Soviet quadripartite responsibilities over Berlin and

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access thereto, including control of the checkpoints at Babelsberg and Marienborn at the eastern and western ends of the autobahn. Its withdrawal from the city would therefore presumably indicate that the Soviet functions there were being transferred to the East Germans and might be the prelude to the legal incorporation of East Berlin into East Germany.

Soviet staff headquarters is located in the so-called Marshal House. Nearby are the Kommandatura communications center, administrative and supply offices of the garrison, and a field branch of the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank). A Military Prosecutors Office is also attached to the Kommandatura. Outside the compound there is a Soviet officers' club; inside, there is a stadium, a swimming pool and gym facilities, and an officers' mess.

In addition, a military clinic under the general direction of the Central Military Hospital at Berlin-Oberschoene-weide provides medical care not only to Soviet troops but to members of the embassy and trade delegation. The Kommandatura also maintains a hotel, a bachelor officers' quarters, and an apartment building, and there is a hunt club for military and civilian personnel.

The group of Soviet military advisers to the East German People's Army residing in the compound has been in the process of dissolution in recent months, and most of these officers reportedly have returned to the USSR. Similarly, the group of Soviet Ministry of Interior (MVD) officers attached to the MfS is being disbanded.

Guard functions for military headquarters are furnished by the Soviet 133rd Independent Guard Battalion, which also provides guards for Spandau prison

and for maintaining control on the US-Soviet sector border.

In recent months Moscow has made various preparations which will permit the withdrawal of the Kommandatura with little or no further notice. It has, however, also taken steps to provide cover under which certain Soviet units--notably the KGB and GRU--could continue to function within the compound. Military units have not withdrawn, and construction in progress outside the city--such as the high-priority building project in the neighborhood of Bernau and Wandlitz--has not been specifically identified for the use of Kommandatura elements. On the other hand, the units have not yet received their 1959 funds for the maintenance of property and housing, and even the commanders reportedly do not know what to expect.

Soviet long-distance telephone exchange facilities in Karlshorst, operated by Soviet military personnel, reportedly are to be dismantled in the near future and removed to an unidentified location. There is some evidence that the Soviet Embassy expects to take over this function from the Kommandatura when the withdrawal occurs.

Soviet Military Intelligence

Since 1957 the USSR has sharply cut the number of GRU installations in Karlshorst, until at present the only major units remaining are the Agent Operations Section and what are believed to be combined elements of the Strategic Intelligence Residentura, naval intelligence, and an intelligence advisory group. GRU reportedly intends to move part of its staff to the headquarters of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany (GSFG) in Wunsdorf but will leave as many operational personnel as possible under cover of the military attaché section of the Soviet Embassy.

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Embassy and Trade Delegation

The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, while outside the compound, has several installations and extensive housing facilities inside. These include the Lux Hotel, used for VIP housing; the Volga Hotel; a motor pool; a house of culture, which supervises the Dram Theater; an amusement area in Letny Park; a film storage and distribution center; and a library. Headquarters of the Soviet Communist party and trade-union organizations, both embassy connected, are also located here. In addition, the embassy maintains an elementary and secondary school outside the compound and a kindergarten and vocational schools inside.

The trade delegation, like the embassy, has its main offices on Unter den Linden and, with the exception of the liaison office of the Wismuth uranium-mining company, only housing and support units are located within the Karlshorst compound. The liaison office's function is to assure swift and uninterrupted deliveries from the Wismuth mines to the USSR.

There is every indication that these civilian installations will remain in the compound, although certain changes may be made in physical arrangements. For example, the Volga Hotel reportedly was released to East German authorities on 1 March, but its restaurant still functions under embassy management. Furthermore, the Dram Theater has ordered an expensive new movie projector, suggesting that there is no intention of withdrawing. Finally, there have been reports that the trade delegation is to be merged with the embassy's economic section. The delegation's motor pool has already been consolidated with that of the embassy inside the compound.

KGB Rezidentura

KGB installations dot the Karlshorst compound. The four-story Rezidentura--the former St. Antonius Hospital--houses all the elements necessary for a self-contained intelligence unit. It is surrounded by a special fence and is under the surveillance of KGB-controlled Soviet guards. Subsidiary to this headquarters are various other KGB administrative and housing units, including a clinic, a hotel, and a motor pool.

KGB counterintelligence headquarters, located adjacent to the Military Prosecutor's Office, includes a section responsible for the loyalty and security of Soviet forces in the Berlin garrison. Certain KGB advisers attached to MfS headquarters also maintain offices there and live in the compound. KGB communications installations are believed to be housed at three points, one within the Kommandatura headquarters area, another on Ehrenfelsstrasse, and the third, in the KGB administrative section on Frankestrasse.

There have been reports that the KGB will vacate the Rezidentura and move its headquarters and all administrative, technical, and communications sections out of Berlin to nearby areas. A German source recently stated that communications personnel had been moved out of the Frankestrasse unit to an unidentified location. Furniture from several housing units reportedly was recently removed on KGB trucks--in two instances to Bernau. This suggests that at least some KGB facilities may move to the Bernau-Wandlitz site.

In recent weeks, the KGB appears to have taken steps to place some of its services under cover. Effective 1 April

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the administrative section reportedly instructed German firms and public utilities to address bills to the Soviet Embassy but gave an address in the compound. During the first quarter of 1959, some 35 apartments were released by the KGB to the MfS. Since there was no indication that the Soviet families had moved out, it appears that some KGB personnel, at least, may continue under MfS cover.

Concurrently, in order to tighten security, the KGB offices have dismissed their German employees. Some of the work formerly done by Germans in the motor pool will be performed by Soviet personnel, and cleaning and janitorial responsibilities are to be carried out by Soviet rather than German women.

Security Precautions

Karlshorst compound is surrounded by a fence six feet


high which was repaired last year at considerable expense; this fence is patrolled by well-armed MfS guards. At night these guards extend their patrols into the compound area, but they no longer are accompanied by dogs. The compound can be entered through either the main vehicle entrance on Waldow Allee or through certain other approved gates; a pass is required with a different document for the various categories of Soviet and East German personnel.

An intensive screening of all East German employees was begun last year, and in recent weeks Soviet authorities have been sharply reducing the number of German employees in the compound. Some individuals who had worked for Soviet authorities since 1945 have been dismissed, and a well-integrated system of MfS informers has been established among the remaining German employees.

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Soviet Intelligence

THE KGB IN EAST GERMANY—
AN AGENT DEFECTOR SUMMARY OF
FACILITIES, TARGETS & TRADECRAFT

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April 1970

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PART III. KGB FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY (DDR)

SOVIET INSTALLATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE KGB

The Karlshorst Rezidentura

The Karlshorst *Rezidentura* is located in a building inside a compound which is bound by four streets: Bodenmaier Weg, Zwieseler Strasse, Dewetallee and Arberstrasse. There are two entrances to the compound, one on Dewetallee, the other on Bodenmaier Weg. One may drive into the area through Dewetallee and, from the south, through the entrance at the control point on the Rheinstrasse. This latter entrance is directly at the intersection of Rheinstrasse and Koepenicker Allee. The building itself is multi-storied and gives the appearance of a barracks or caserne. There are a number of high antenna masts on the roof, all connected to each other by cables; thus, the building is easily recognizable and the masts are visible from afar. (Source Comment: He has never entered the building and therefore can provide no description of the interior.) Before moving into the present *Rezidentura*, the KGB had offices in the large building located on the corner of Frankestrasse and Koepenicker Allee.

The regular office hours at the *Rezidentura* are from 0800-1300 hours, 1400-1600 hours. Evidently there is a rotating duty roster which all KGB case officers are subject to since each case officer serves periodically as Duty Officer and remains in the *Rezidentura* overnight. Even though a KGB officer works the evening before, he is in the office punctually in the morning. Source frequently called about 0800 hours and found his KGB contact already at work. An agent (such as Source) wishing to contact his case officer after hours does not call the Duty Officer at the *Rezidentura*, but contacts his case officer directly at the latter's home, no matter what the hour. (Source Comment: The Duty Officer's function is not to serve as a communication channel between the *Rezidentura* and the agents. The Duty Officer is probably in charge

of the physical security of the *Rezidentura*.) Every Monday morning, KGB case officers meet for their weekly political discussion. Party meetings take place on an irregular basis.

Many of the KGB case officers who were working in the Karlshorst *Rezidentura* had identity documents issued by the DDR Foreign Ministry which stated that the bearer was a member of the USSR Embassy in the DDR.

The Soviet Hospital in East Berlin

There is a Soviet hospital, used by both Soviet Embassy personnel and the KGB, which is located in the area bounded by Rummelsburgerstrasse, Hermann Duncker Strasse, and Am Walde. The hospital entrance, which is on Hermann Duncker Strasse, is guarded at all times by a Soviet soldier.

The Motor Pool in East Berlin

The motor pool and repair facilities for vehicles used by all Soviet installations in East Berlin, including the KGB, is located at the intersection of Rummelsburger Landstrasse and Grenzweg on the pre-war property of the *Allgemeine Elektrizitaets Gesellschaft* (AEG). Its official designation is "Motor Pool of the Soviet Embassy." The entrance, which is always guarded by an armed Soviet soldier, is on Grenzweg. There is a formal control point through which visitors must pass. Although Source never actually entered the motor pool, he did notice in passing that most of the cars are of Western manufacture. The majority are Volkswagens, but there are some Moskvich cars and a few Wartburgs. Source saw no Skodas. Soviet army mechanics work on the cars.

Vehicles used by the KGB bear regular East Berlin registrations which are issued by the MfS. Prior to the end of 1968, all Soviet vehicles were licensed through the Soviet Embassy. Toward the end of 1968, vehicles of all embassies in the DDR were issued red license plates to differentiate the

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embassy vehicles from regular DDR cars. Thus in order to remain anonymous, the KGB had to change the system of registering their cars through the embassy.

Shopping Facilities in East Berlin

The Soviets do not have exclusive shopping facilities similar to some of the Western countries, which provide their personnel with goods in exchange for the respective Western currency. However, there is a store, stocking mainly Soviet goods, located in Andernacher Strasse where Soviets do shop. Anyone, including West Berliners, DDR citizens and members of the Allied military from West Berlin, may shop there. All the employees of the store are Soviet nationals and can speak only Russian.

Rest Homes in the DDR

Source was aware of the existence of only one KGB vacation facility—a house located on a lake near Neustrelitz. KGB case officers and families usually use vacation and recreation facilities which belong to the MfS. One such MfS house is located on a lake east of Berlin. Also, there is an MfS vacation house in Masserberg, Thuringia. Source never used any of these facilities.

KGB District Offices in the DDR

KGB District Offices are located in Soviet *Kommandatura* buildings. Each Soviet *Kommandatura* is well known in the headquarters town, and directions for finding it can be easily obtained by inquiring on the street. Each KGB District Office, depending upon the size of the district, contains from five to twenty KGB officers. While Source was not permitted entry to the Karlshorst *Rezidentura* building, he could walk directly into any KGB District Office. Although Source has not visited all of the District Offices, he has dealt with the KGB chief or other KGB officers of the following District Offices: Leipzig, Gera, Magdeburg, Neustrelitz, Frankfurt/Oder, Suhl, and Rostock. KGB District Chiefs maintain close contact with the Karlshorst *Rezidentura* and frequently travel to East Berlin. KGB case officers from Karlshorst also frequently visit KGB District Offices.

Source did not notice any radios or tape recorders in any of the KGB District Offices he visited. Neither did he see any Soviet females in these offices.

(1) *The District Office in Magdeburg:* This KGB District Office is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura*, a large building. There is a fence around the building and an armed Soviet soldier stands guard in an anteroom just inside the entrance. Source, who visited the Magdeburg District Office only once, in 1957, could not pinpoint the location of the KGB offices in the building because there were so many hallways and turns involved in getting to the KGB section. He saw only one room of the KGB section. A relatively small room, it contained a safe with a key lock, one desk, and a long conference table which was pushed against the desk in T-formation. He is certain that there were other KGB rooms in this building, since the KGB case officer he dealt with at the time would leave the room, walk a few paces, and, judging by the sound of opening and closing doors, enter another room.

(2) *The District Office in Gera:* The KGB office is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura*, a three-story building which is opposite (kitty-corner) to the railroad station. There was no guard posted outside the building. However, in an anteroom just inside the entrance to the building, there is a small guard room, with a glass window, where a visitor was required to report on entering the building. The KGB occupied several rooms on the top floor. Source saw only one room in the KGB section. The room was small. It contained a safe with a key lock, a desk, and a conference table which was pushed against the desk in T-formation. Source believed, but is not certain, that the door to this room was padded on the inside.

(3) *The District Office in Neustrelitz:* The KGB District Office in Neustrelitz is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura*, a three-story building. The building is surrounded by a brick wall. In on side of the wall, there is an iron gate through which cars may drive into a courtyard. The KGB office which Source visited was located on the second or third floor. The room was a very large one and contained a safe with a key lock, a desk, and large conference table which was pushed against the desk in T-formation.

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(4) *The District Office in Suhl:* The Suhl KGB office is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura* building and is approximately a five-minute walk from the Suhl Railroad Station. Across the street from the *Kommandatura* is a small hill with a building which may be either a church or a government office. The *Kommandatura*, a two-story building, is about the size of a four-family house. It sits directly on the street and is surrounded by a metal fence. There is a yard which contains a front garden. There is no space inside the yard for automobiles, which must be parked on the street. The gate through the metal fence is always kept locked. Entrance is gained by ringing a bell. The visitor must then state his business to an armed Soviet soldier who comes to the gate. Source was never confronted with this situation, since he was always in the company of a KGB case officer who would take care of any explanations to the soldier.

Source was in only one room of the KGB section. This office was located on the top floor, on the right hand side as one faces the building from the street. The room contained two desks, a metal safe with a key lock, a table, and a picture of Lenin. There was a telephone in the room, telephone number unknown. However, the telephone number was an extension from the MfS District Office. The entrance door to the room was padded on the inside. Source believes that this one room housed the entire KGB District Office in Suhl. Source knew of two KGB officers there: a Colonel (name unknown) whose private residence was located in Suhl at Schmiedefeldstrasse 83, first floor left, and another officer known as Gennadiy.

TELEPHONE AND POSTAL SERVICES IN THE DDR

Telephone and Telegraph Communications

Only local calls can be made from the telephone booths located on the sidewalks in East Berlin.

Long-distance telephone calls can be made from all Post Offices in East Berlin. Each has a "Long-distance telephone section" from which one may place a long-distance call. Before placing the call, the caller must deposit DME 5 or DME 10 with the clerk as insurance that the caller will not disappear without paying the bill. The caller, after placing the deposit, gives the clerk the telephone number to be called and the city wherein it is lo-

cated. He then waits in the lobby of the Post Office until the clerk pages him and assigns him to a telephone booth. The booths are numbered and have doors to insure privacy. No identification documents are required to place a long-distance call. Telephone calls to most countries, including the United States but excluding West Germany, can be put through in less than ten minutes' time. Telephone calls to West Germany can take as long as five or six hours because there are so few lines available, and many calls are continuously placed between East and West Germany. The DDR Government refuses to install additional lines, thus the delay in telephone traffic. (*Source Comment:* In placing some long-distance calls, he would wait only a few minutes, then cancel the call, since any delay in completing the call might indicate the possibility that, either routinely or for some specific reason, the call was being monitored.)

Long-distance calls can also be placed from one's own home or from a public place, such as a hotel or restaurant. These latter have the facilities and permit the placing of calls, knowing the caller will remain to pay the costs.

Telegrams can be sent from Post Offices or by private telephone, in which case the cost of the telegram is charged to the telephone owner. No identification documents are required to send a telegram from the Post Office. While there is a section on the telegram which the sender has to fill in regarding the sender's name and address, one may use any name and address, or even no name and address, except that the latter would look suspicious.

Postal Services and Censorship

Postage stamps can be purchased at Post Offices, stationery stores, hotels, and newspaper stands. Registered letters can be sent only from a Post Office. No identity documents are needed to send registered letters. When registered letters are delivered to the addressee's home, no identity document need be shown to take possession of the letter, but the addressee must sign for it. If the addressee is not at home, the mailman leaves a slip of paper notifying the resident that there is some registered mail for him, whereupon he must go to the Post Office to pick it up. When picking up registered letters at the Post Office, the addressee

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must show identity documents. Identity documents must also be shown when picking up money orders or packages at the Post Office.

Source had no information concerning routine censorship imposed on domestic mail within the DDR. International mail is censored on a spot-check basis. The exception to the aforementioned is mail addressed to or sent by individuals whose names are placed on a "Watchlist."

Post Office boxes can be rented by going to the postmaster's office, filling out a form requesting the rental of a Post Office box, and producing identity documents. No reason need be given for wanting to rent the box. The box rental is due and payable quarterly at one of the Post Office windows. No identity documents need be shown when paying the rental. The payer merely gives his box number and pays the fee.

LIAISON BETWEEN THE KGB AND THE MfS IN THE DDR

In 1953 Source's KGB case officer told him that the top echelon of the MfS knew of Source's employment as a full-time KGB agent in the DDR, presumably as Karl HAGER.

Source has little knowledge of the MfS since he never worked with the MfS on any operation. Only once was an MfS agent turned over to him by an MfS officer.

From the time of Source's arrival in the DDR in 1953 until the early 1960's, he noted that the KGB had appeared to have sufficient money at its disposal for conducting any type of intelligence operation. Additionally, the KGB received whatever operational support (e.g., name checks, documentation, backstopping, etc.) it required immediately from the MfS whenever that was considered necessary. During this period, it appeared to Source that the KGB pretty much ran things in the DDR as far as intelligence matters were concerned. In 1963, however, Source learned from three friends who were also full-time agents of the KGB that all of the KGB *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter* in the DDR, with the exception of Source, were to be dismissed from the KGB. This was confirmed to Source by his KGB Section Chief. Source was told that he was too valuable to the KGB and thus would not be released. Those *Hauptamtlicher*

Mitarbeiter who were dropped by the KGB were picked up by the MfS, according to statements later made to Source by one of his subsequent KGB case officers and by a former *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter*. As far as Source could determine, this mass dismissal of *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter* was due to the probability that the KGB apparently no longer had sufficient funds for salaries. In this regard, Source believed that some of the KGB budget in the DDR was derived from occupation costs levied on the DDR (a treaty was apparently reached between the USSR and the DDR, reducing the latter's occupation payments). This loss of revenue to the Soviets in the DDR might have caused the dismissal of Source's colleagues. Source also noted that after 1963 the KGB was not nearly as generous with its gifts and bonuses as it had previously been. Another factor, in Source's opinion, was the growing feeling of independence and national sovereignty of the DDR. One of Source's KGB case officers and a KGB officer from one of the District Offices told Source independently, and at different times, that "now we are only guests here . . . we can only request things from the MfS, not demand." Additionally, a former *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter* told Source in about 1967 that the MfS no longer did things the way the Soviets wanted.

It is a basic rule of the KGB in the DDR that the MfS should know as little as possible about KGB activities. This rule was repeatedly violated, as Source notes. Many of the leads he worked on came from the MfS, and considerable operational support was afforded by the MfS even in those cases where they did not supply the leads. Sometimes they helped Source make an initial contact. Additionally, the MfS is evidently aware of all the leads which are followed up by the KGB Liaison Officer to the MfS. (Comment: A Colonel LESSIN, first name unknown, is the KGB Liaison Officer who is called by the MfS border guards whenever persons of operational interest pass through the East/West Berlin border-crossing point.)

It is Source's opinion that the KGB and the MfS have agreed that operations in the DDR involving the American target are to be handled by the KGB. Source bases this opinion on the fact that all of the leads, either offered or supported by the MfS, invariably dealt with the American target. He does not know whether there is a similar agree-

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ment whereby the West German target is handled solely by the MfS. He doubts that such an agreement exists since he knows that the West German target is also worked on by the KGB. He knows of no case involving a West German citizen that the KGB developed itself and then later exposed to the MfS or for which any operational support was requested from the MfS. Once the KGB had a unilateral operation going, it was kept unilateral. There were no restrictions or prohibitions whatsoever on the KGB in regard to its recruitment of DDR citizens. However, Source was emphatically convinced that the MfS, in turn, was not allowed to recruit or otherwise make any operational use of a Soviet citizen without the knowledge, consent and assistance of the KGB.

At the District-Office level of the KGB, liaison between the KGB and MfS personnel was usually on a very close and personal basis. For example,

Source knows that the KGB Chief in Suhl and the KGB Chief in Neustrelitz often went hunting with their MfS counterparts. The KGB Chief in Neustrelitz once turned down Source's offer for lunch, saying that he felt he should go hunting with his MfS colleague to cement their rapport and relationship.

As stated above, KGB officers and families usually use vacation and recreation facilities which belong to the MfS. Apparently, since Source was told about it by his KGB case officers, neither the KGB nor the MfS had any qualms about mixing a large number of their staff officers and families at the vacation home in Masserberg, Thuringia. Source had no information regarding its administration, since he was never there, but he presumes that the MfS and KGB officers using the Masserberg facility went there under some kind of alias.

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23 Jul 58

has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 5/2/95

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ERP 95-1

Lt Gen E.P. FITOVRANOV

Source: A clandestine source of established authenticity

Date of Information: May 1955 - April 1956

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report, based on information available from this source as of 22 Jul 58, is one of a series on senior military intelligence and KGB officers in East Germany.

II. BACKGROUND

2. Full Name: Evgenii ("Zhenya") Petrovich FITOVRANOV
Rank: Lieutenant General
Assignment: Chief KGB Residentura, BERLIN, and concurrently, Senior Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, BERLIN.
Date of Birth: Estimated between 1910 - 1915.
Residence in USSR: MOSCOW (Tel No K-4 1751)
3. Wife: Elisaveta Vasil'evna FITOVRANOVA
Children: Daughter (first name possibly Gavrilova). There were other children in the household in BERLIN but it is not certain whether they were FITOVRANOV's children or grandchildren (see paras 6 and 7).

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Other Relatives:
PITOVORANOV

Dr Natalya Vasil'ovna PETROVA, probably PITOVORANOV's sister-in-law. (This relationship was not conclusively established, but is based on her sharing the same patronymic with his wife, and a request by PITOVORANOV to his wife, after a family conversation, to "kiss Natalya and Mama for me"; on 11 Mar 56 PITOVORANOV booked a private telephone call to Dr PETROVA of the "First Surgical Section" of a hospital in MOSCOW, Tel No K-6 8974; (the only N.V. PETROVA listed in the 1954 edition of the MOSCOW Telephone Directory resided at 6, Shchusova Ulitsa Tel No K-4 6696).

4. Education and Accent:

No information is available from source material on PITOVORANOV's educational background other than that he speaks as a well-educated man with a Great Russian (MOSCOW) accent.

III. OTHER PERSONAL PARTICULARS

5. Details of Family:

Mme PITOVORANOV's rather listless and apathetic manner during her telephone conversations gave the impression that she was either a sick person or one of negative personality. She seemed unable to raise any enthusiasm when appealed to by her husband on 20 Oct 55 to fly back from MOSCOW to BERLIN on the following day. She agreed only after much prompting, despite the fact that her younger children (or possibly grandchildren) appeared to be in Germany. (Her reaction may have arisen from the fact that she had just suffered the loss of her mother, Elisaveta Ivanovna (anu), who died on 17 Oct 55). PITOVORANOVA was noticeably apathetic, however, in a February 1956 discussion with a staff officer of Marshal A.A. GREECHKO (GinG, GSFG) on the question of certain domestic transactions for Mme GREECHKO.

6. Mme PITOVORANOV was in MOSCOW again in December 1955 and flew back to BERLIN with her granddaughter on the 24th or 25th of that month. On 10 Jan 56 she flew again to MOSCOW, this time with her daughter, and possibly granddaughter, but was present in BERLIN on 23 Feb 56 when she attended the Red Army Day reception at the Soviet Embassy.

7. An exact identification of the junior members of the family was not possible from the few passing references available in source material. PITOVORANOV once said, in answer to his wife's telephone enquiry from MOSCOW, that "the children are doing their lessons" and mentioned "Seresha" (Sergei) by name. Other references to a daughter and granddaughter, however, made in connection with bookings of plane flights, leave the question open as to whether they were in fact PITOVORANOV's children or grandchildren.

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8. Recreations: Shooting, fishing, and tennis.

IV. CHARACTER AND EFFICIENCY

9. There is evidence that PITOVANOV was quick and incisive when making decisions and was esteemed as a man who backs up his subordinates. If it is assumed that the efficiency of his unit reflected his own capabilities, then on at least one occasion he was awarded a considerable compliment by a military intelligence colonel who had recourse to PITOVANOV and his organization for help with an operation.

10. Col M.G. BELOV (Chief of an element in BERLIN subordinate to the Intelligence Directorate, HQ, GSFG) approached the KGB Residentura for help and co-operation with some agent activities on 17 Dec 55. This involved calling on the chiefs of five departments and finally discussing the matter with PITOVANOV. The results, as described by BELOV to Col V.I. SMIRNOV and Lt Col Yu.P. BULKOV (both of the Operations Department, Intelligence Directorate, HQ, GSFG), were that PITOVANOV had "stated his decisions swiftly" and had said that he would "give the order immediately."

11. Later, in reply to SMIRNOV's query as to the success of the operation, BELOV said that it had gone excellently - in fact, he had been told that it was "as quick as lightning" and nobody had noticed anything. PITOVANOV's people had made all the security arrangements, as well as directing the affair, and had done it very well.

12. A tribute to PITOVANOV was paid by M.I. MARCHEUKO (Deputy Chief, Department 2, KGB Residentura element, EISENHAR-SCHENAU) while discussing pressure of work with a friend: he said that things were so hot it was "like sitting on a powder barrel," but it was very good working with PITOVANOV as "he is a fighter and stands up for his people."

13. Source has provided some indication of PITOVANOV's standing with senior officers outside the KGB. In brief talks with Maj Gen MALIN (Chief, Frontier Control Directorate, HQ, GSFG) and Maj Gen P.V. VASHURA (Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, HQ, GSFG) it was clear that they both treated him with every respect. PITOVANOV in his turn spoke quietly and politely but with noticeable firmness and authority.

14. Maj Gen P.A. DIEROVA (Commandant, Soviet Garrison, BERLIN) was somewhat disdainful about PITOVANOV's plan for hunting wild boar at night with the use of boaters and infra-red telescopic sights. DIEROVA commented to Lt Gen A.Ya. KALYAGIN (GSFG liaison with DDR), that PITOVANOV was a fool to introduce a system which reflected on his hunting ability; he was also concerned over the danger of some of the local population getting killed in the process.

V. MOVEMENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

15. PITOVANOV flew back from MOSCOW to Germany on or about 14 Aug 55. This was revealed in a conversation on 13 August with Maj Gen VASHURA who, having just returned from MOSCOW himself, advised PITOVANOV to fly back with an aircraft which was available on the following day. The reasons for this visit to MOSCOW, and its duration,

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are not known to source.

16. There is evidence that PITOVORANOV paid a visit to STAHNSDORF between 23 and 27 Jan 56. Capt M.T. KOZYREV (KGB CI officer with 260 Independent Line Construction Battalion, then at STAHNSDORF) on 30 January tried to contact his superior officer, Col G.V. SHATALOV (Chief, KGB CI Department, in BERLIN). Failing to do so, he gave Lt Col V.M. SPIVAKOV (SHATALOV's deputy) the news that PITOVORANOV had come "here to me", but he did not know on what business. SPIVAKOV replied that KOZYREV, if invited by PITOVORANOV, was to go to the Residentura and tell him all he wanted to know. The purpose of PITOVORANOV's visit may have been to investigate personally the after-effects of the defection of Lt I.V. OVCHINNIKOV from the 28 Special Purpose Radio Regiment (HQ, STAHNSDORF; subordinate to the GSFC Intelligence Directorate); STAHNSDORF was also the location of a KGB Radio Intercept Station.

17. On 28 Jan 56 PITOVORANOV flew to MOSCOW and on 6 February an aircraft was sent from East Germany to MOSCOW to bring him back. The take-off for the return journey was to be at PITOVORANOV's convenience. G.M. FUSHKIN (Soviet Ambassador to the DDR) wished to be given the place of landing in MOSCOW so that he could inform PITOVORANOV.

18. On 12 Feb 56 he flew again to MOSCOW, this time in the company of Marshal GRECHKO and Ambassador FUSHKIN, presumably for the Twentieth Congress, CPSU. His date of return is not known to source, but his presence in BERLIN again was confirmed on 12 Mar 56.

19. PITOVORANOV paid a visit to KARL-MARK-STADT (CHEMNITZ) on 11 or 12 Apr 56. This was stated by BEDIK (fnu; KGB advisor to the East German Ministry for State Security) when receiving instructions for submitting to PITOVORANOV a report on an industrial explosion.

VI. FRIENDS AND CONTACTS

20. In view of PITOVORANOV's status, those personalities who appear to have connections with him only as a result of working relationships have been included, as also those whose identity and therefore importance could not be defined by source.

B.S. ALEKSEIKO

21. The wife of Boris Sergeevich ALEKSEIKO, (Head, 'Soviet Export Film' office, BERLIN) was able to supply the BERLIN home telephone number of the PITOVORANOV's at the request of Maj Gen G.K. TSINIEV (Chief, KGB Third [CI] Directorate, POTSDAM).

S.T. ASTAVIN

22. The "Sergei Timofeevich" who called on PITOVORANOV on 18 Oct 55 was probably Sergei Timofeevich ASTAVIN (Chief, Political Department, Soviet Embassy, BERLIN, who dealt with WISMUT affairs). On this occasion he went to the cinema with PITOVORANOV and the latter's deputy, Col M.N. GOLOVKOV, the wives of both then being in the USSR.

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A.A. GRECHKO

23. The FITOVRANOV's relationship with Marshal Andrei Antonovich GRECHKO and Mme GRECHKO were friendly, as far as can be judged from source material, but there is no evidence that they extended beyond a sympathetic regard for each other in their appointed spheres. GRECHKO sent a telegram of congratulation to "Evgenii Petrovich" on the anniversary of the October Revolution, wishing him success in his activities "from the bottom of my heart", and Mme GRECHKO selected Mme FITOVRANOV as the most suitably prominent escort for her daughter at the Red Army Day reception in 1956. Mme GRECHKO was also concerned with Mme FITOVRANOV in transactions involving the selection of a watch for the former and the selling of skins or furs.

V.V. NARUDDINOV/NARUETINOV and Ya.S. NASRIDDINOVA

24. Viktor Vasil'ovich NARUDDINOV was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet and First Secretary of the TASHKENT City Party Committee. He was member of a delegation of deputies to the Supreme Soviet which was touring the DDR in November/December 1955. On 4 December he was in KARL-MARK-STADT (CHEMNITZ) and telephoned his wife Yadgar Sadykovna NASRIDDINOVA from the Soviet Consulate. NASRIDDINOVA was in MOSCOW and had just attended a birthday party given by FURTSEVA (presumably E.A. FURTSEVA of the Central Committee). They discussed political matters in both the Russian and Turkmen languages. NARUDDINOV also told his wife that "many of the comrades" who knew her sent their greetings, and mentioned FUSEKIN (see para 25), FITOVRANOV, KISELEV (u/i) and GUSEV (u/i, at KARL-MARK-STADT) in that order.

Comment: Another source has confirmed that a Ya.S. NASRIDDINOVA was a member of the Central Committee elected at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. Despite the discrepancy in names there is considerable evidence that the speakers were husband and wife.

G.M. FUSEKIN

25. FITOVRANOV's official position (Senior Counsellor) with the Soviet Embassy in East BERLIN appeared to involve some degree of active partnership with Ambassador Georgii Maksimovich FUSEKIN. Source was unable to determine FUSEKIN's exact position vis-a-vis FITOVRANOV, i.e., whether he played a role more significant than acting as a "front" for the latter.

FUZANOV (fmu)

26. On the orders of FITOVRANOV, a message was relayed on 7 or 8 Dec 55 to the Frontier Control Directorate, HQ, GSFG, on the subject of FUZANOV and his wife, who apparently had recently arrived in BERLIN. They were leaving BERLIN the next day via the same check point on route for BAD BRANDBACH (District KARL-MARK-STADT, on the borders of Czechoslovakia), and they would arrive at the

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frontier at 1600 hours. They would be escorted by N.M. GALUSHIN (Chief of KGB Residentura Secretariat) and would call at LEIPZIG on the way.

P.V. VASHURA

27. Some degree of familiarity was shown by Maj Gen Petr Vladimirovich VASHURA when, addressing FITOVRANOV by first name and patronymic, he explained why he had been unable to fulfill an arrangement to travel together with the latter on a return flight from MOSCOW to Germany (see also para 14). Since neither used the intimate form of speech and since VASHURA showed a marked deference to FITOVRANOV, this was, presumably, a friendly working relationship. (Subsequently, according to other sources, VASHURA was promoted to become Chief of the GSFC Political Directorate).

Antonina Pavlovna (anu)

28. A lady of this name wished the news of the death of FITOVRANOV's mother-in-law to be passed to him by his deputy, Col GOLOVKOV, should he not already have heard from Mme FITOVRANOVA. This message was relayed to GOLOVKOV by his wife, who was in MOSCOW at that time.

Newspaper Editor

29. On 14 Sep 55, FITOVRANOV booked a telephone call to "the editor of the newspaper TSINYA in RIGA." No information is available from source to identify the editor or to explain this action.

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

USSR/Poland

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

Activities of General Ivan A. Serov
in Poland

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 1060
REFERENCES RD
Date 8/23/94
GRP 94-1

1944 - 1945

Q. Germany

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. Source first met General Ivan Aleksandrovich SEROV in the fall of 1944 in Wolomin, Poland, where SEROV, who was then head of all Soviet SMERSH operational groups in Poland, had his headquarters.¹ SEROV was introduced to source as General IVANOV, and this is the only name source knows him to have used while in Poland. From other Soviets source learned soon after this meeting that IVANOV's true name was SEROV. Source has also positively identified photographs of SEROV as the man he knew under the name of IVANOV. Source does not know the name MALINOV and has never heard this name in connection with SEROV. Source states the following facts from very close personal association with SEROV during 1944-1945, and from information obtained from other Soviets attached to SMERSH, with whom source lived and worked during this period.
2. SEROV arrived in Poland with the advancing Red Army in 1944 as the head of SMERSH ("Death to Spies," Soviet Military Counter-Intelligence). His first headquarters were in Lublin, then these were transferred to Wolomin, then - about early 1945 - to the Warsaw suburb of Praga on Sieradzka Street. About May 1945, sometime after the fall of Berlin, when the headquarters of the Soviet Army were transferred to Germany, SEROV also transferred to Germany, and after that date had nothing more to do with Polish affairs and as far as source knows never returned to Poland.
3. Successors to SEROV as top Soviet security officer in Poland were the following generals, all of whom are believed to have been officers of the NKVD: Nikolay Nikolayevich SELIVANOVSKIY (1945 - for unknown period), DAVIDOV (unknown period up to ca. 1951-1952), Nikolay Kuzmich KOVALCHUK (ca. 1951 to 1953), and IALIN (from ca. 1953 for an unknown

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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period). During SEROV's tenure of office as chief of SMERSH in Poland (1944-1945), one of his subordinates was a General MEINIKOV, also personally known to source. Source at no time has heard the name MALINOV, or of anyone else, other than the above named generals, who was the chief Soviet security officer in Poland.

4. During SEROV's stay in Poland he was exceedingly active in all security matters. He personally planned, directed, and was informed of all security cases of significance. No operations were run, or prominent individuals arrested, without his knowledge and approval, and, according to source, "all security actions were under his personal supervision and personal care." SEROV was responsible for counterespionage in Poland, and personally saw all interesting documents and reports, personally attended portions of most interesting interrogations, etc. According to source, he personally had his hand in almost every case, and knew most details of everything that was being done in counterespionage in Poland. He had the overall direction of all operations against the AK (Home Army, non-Communist underground), the SN (Peasant Party), etc. He devised the plan for the arrest of Wincenty WITOS, leader of the Peasant Party. He personally recruited many agents, including Boleslaw PIASECKI, now chairman of the PAX organization of proregime Catholics; BLENKOWSKI, AK leader who was later in the Polish Parliament; Tadeusz REK, who was Vice Minister of Justice in 1953; one unidentified agent with the pseudonym ATAMAN; and an unidentified woman from Lublin who had been active there in the AK and who identified to him all AK personnel in that area.
5. SEROV was unusually energetic and worked very long hours. He often woke source in the middle of the night to arrest a particular individual of interest to him in an investigation. He also took one of source's agents, a woman, GRUBER (fnu), born ca. 1918-1919, with him to Germany when he left to use her in operations there. An insight into SEROV's operational mentality can be had from the following incident. Source first met SEROV at a meeting which had been arranged in Wolomin in order that SEROV express his views regarding the future of a certain case. The case was that of the AK leader of the Warsaw district, Colonel "ALEKSANDER", who had been arrested by the MO (Citizens Militia), and whom the leader of the MO for the Warsaw district, Grzegorz KORCZINSKI - today head of Polish Military Intelligence (Q-II) - wanted to liquidate on the spot. SEROV rejected this proposal, and ordered the case taken over by the Soviets, pointing out to KORCZINSKI that "ALEKSANDER" could and should be made to talk, thereby being much more useful in the OE investigation than if he were dead.
6. Source believes that SEROV was unquestionably the motivating force behind the arrest of the 16 Polish underground leaders in 1945 who revealed themselves to the Soviets after being

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

Date 8/23/94

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located at Pruszkow under the command of the Soviet officer PIMONOV. These and all other SMESH units were directly responsible to SEROV. Most or all of these units were involved in operations against the AK in their area, and there was close coordination of these operations from Wolomin, i.e., by SEROV. PIMONOV somehow got in touch with an underground general and offered him and others safe conduct if he and others would reveal themselves. This was obviously done with SEROV's knowledge and approval, since nothing of this magnitude was ever done without his approval. The underground leaders were then arrested by PIMONOV and his men. SEROV probably planned this betrayal himself, but the operation was actually carried out by his subordinate PIMONOV.

7. Source knows nothing further about SEROV's activities. He has very great respect for him, considering him extremely intelligent, a very hard worker, with great experience and knowledge in the field of intelligence work, capable of making decisions whenever necessary and not afraid to accept responsibility. Source states that SEROV was not only highly respected by his subordinates for his ability, but was very well liked for his human treatment of subordinates - knowing, for example, when they had earned a rest from the intense pace of operations at that time, and showing appreciation when work was well done. Source believes that SEROV must have had a high protector in Moscow because of his complete self-confidence and willingness to assume responsibility in the direction of these CE operations. Source believes that he is probably also a completely convinced Communist.
1. Headquarters Comment: It is believed that SEROV was not merely head of SMERSH in Poland but had wider responsibilities for intelligence and counterintelligence activities in Poland.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

9/58

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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY USSR
 SUBJECT Organization of the Soviet Intelligence Organs
 REPORT NO. CS-
 DATE DISTR. FEB 24 1955
 NO. OF PAGES 9
 DATE OF INFO. December 1952
 REQUIREMENT NO. RD
 PLACE ACQUIRED Germany
 APPROVED FOR RELEASE THROUGH THE HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Date 10/21/94

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPEARANCE OF CODEWORDS IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Reliable source (U) with access to this information. Appraisal of Content: 3.

The Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the MVD:

1. The Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye) of the MVD was created by a directive of the Council of Ministers, USSR, in December 1943. The directive was signed by Stalin. (Lieutenant General) Sergey Ivanovich Yoltsov was appointed as Chief of the GRU, MVD, which was composed of two directorates: the First Directorate (Intelligence) and the Second Directorate (Counterintelligence).
2. The First or Intelligence Directorate (Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye) carried on active intelligence and counterintelligence work abroad. The directing body of the First Directorate was:
 - a. Chief - (Major General) Yevgeniy Petrovich Pitovranov.
 - b. Deputy Chief - (Lieutenant General) Petr Vasilyevich Fedotov.
 - c. Deputy Chief - (Colonel) Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Bakharovskiy.
 - d. (Colonel) Andrey Makarovich Oroschenko. - Although Oroschenko, as a former Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate of the MVD, for pay and prestige purposes hold the title of Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, he was actually a section chief, possibly for Near East affairs. Oroschenko is 45 to 47 years old. He is of average height (170 cm) and weighs approximately 90 kg. His build is heavy and he has a large paunch. He has a dark complexion, dark eyes, and thin dark hair, which he wears brushed straight back. He has a round, puffy face and a large bulky nose. He speaks in a husky voice and has a slow, ponderous walk. He has been with the Soviet security services for at least 15 years, almost always in important positions. Until 1951 he had been a member of the Advisory Board (Poleyniy) of the Committee of Information (KI) and a deputy chairman of the KI for the Near East.

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AIR/SEC																			

1. Washington distribution indicated by "X". Field distribution by "R".

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3. The Intelligence Directorate was composed of the following sections:

- a. American Section or Section of the Principal Enemy (Glavnyy Protivnik). This was the first section and was responsible for the United States, including Alaska, and all of Latin America, but not Canada.
- b. English (British) Section - England, its colonies, and the members of the Commonwealth, except Australia, India, and Pakistan.
- c. Anti-German (Third) Section - Germany and Austria. As the section was originally organized, Colonel Gennadiy Stepanovich Yevdokimov was Chief of Section. Yevdokimov, born in 1912, had worked in London to late 1949 or early 1950, was an advisor in Hungary in 1950, and in 1950-51 was Deputy Chief of the Khabarovsk Kray HVD. Colonel Mikhail Nikolayevich Kostakov was Deputy Chief for Germany, and Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Yemelyanovich Siomoluk was Deputy Chief for Austria. Siomoluk had worked in Austria until 1952. He had had experience in diversion and partisan activities. During the war he had trained saboteurs and partisans and had made jumps himself behind the German lines in Kiev and Mogiliv. He is about 40 years old and an engineer by profession. He is married and has one child. Yevdokimov was later transferred to be a Deputy Chief of the Advisors' Section and Shestakov was sent to Rumania. Gorakly (fnu) became Deputy Chief for Germany and, in effect, acting chief of the section.
- d. European (Fourth) Section - France, Benelux, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Yugoslavia. (Colonel) Ivan Ivanovich Agayants was section chief and Colonel Yuzubal (fnu) was his deputy.
- e. Scandinavian Section - Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden. (Colonel) Tarasov (fnu) was section chief.
- f. Near East Section - Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Ethiopia. The chief of the section was (Colonel) Yeliseyev.
- g. Asian Section - India, Pakistan, the countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, Indonesia.
- h. Far East Section - Japan, South Korea, China, Philippines, Hong Kong, Australia.
- i. Counterintelligence (Hatch) Section (Protivrazvedchatelnyy Otdel) - The section chief was (Colonel) Sergey Mikhailovich Podoseyov.
- j. Advisors' Section (Sovetskoye Otdel) - Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, China, North Korea, Mongolia. The section chief was (Colonel) Sergey Nikolayevich Kartanov and his deputy was Colonel Gostneyshiy.
- k. "G" Section - Soviet colonies abroad. The section chief was Colonel Koshevnikov.
- l. "W" - Migration (Emigratsiya) Section. The section chief was Lieutenant Colonel Yeliseyev. He is 40 to 42 years old. He is short and has a normal build except for a small paunch. His hair is dirty blond and he has light eyebrows and lashes. His complexion is light. He does not wear glasses.
- m. Deep Cover Section (Otdel Molodtsov) - The section chief was (Colonel) Aleksandr Yeliseyevich Korotkov.
- n. Scientific-Technical Intelligence Section (Otdel Nauchnoy-Tekhnicheskoy Razvedki) - The section chief was Colonel Krasnikov.
- o. Cipher Section
- p. Operational Registry and Archives (Operativnyy Uchet i Arkhiv) or 16th Section - Section Chief, (Colonel) Polyakov (fnu). Colonel Polyakov has been with the security services for more than 25 years and in June 1953 was sent to China as

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an INW advisor.

- q. Personnel Section (Otdel Kadrov) - The section chief was Colonel Boris Petrovich Sorogin.
- r. Secretariat - The section chief was (Lieutenant Colonel) Fedor Yakovlevich Gubarenko.
- s. Finance Section - The section chief was (Colonel) Tarakanovskiy.
- t. Foreign Language Courses - This unit was not formally a section, although in size it approximated one. The unit was headed by a major who knew four or five languages. He was about 50 years old, was tall, and tried to create the impression that his linguistic accomplishments were more than they were in fact. The major had a large staff of instructors under him, as well as a regular administrative staff. At the beginning of each training year, in the fall, various sections of the Directorate submitted to the language training unit the names of persons selected for language training. The language unit then organized small groups of two, three, or four persons. Each group met three times a week for two hours each session. Since the working day was from 1130 to 1200 and the language groups met from 0900 to 1100 or 1000 to 1200, alternatively, part of the instruction was on the student's own time and part on government time. Some groups met from 2000 to 2200. Those taking language training were not excused from their normal duties. Language instruction was usually provided for officers who would need the language in their work. In the case of a transfer from one geographical area to another, however, an officer would be permitted to complete a course already begun in a language even though he might no longer need to know it.
4. The Second (Counterintelligence) Directorate was responsible for counterintelligence in the foreign embassies and other foreign installations located within the USSR. Among the personnel were:
 - a. Chief - (Lieutenant General) V.S. Ryamov. In early March 1953, Ryamov became chief of the GRU, MVD. Ryamov is a Great Russian, about 50 years old. He is 161 cm tall, stout (weighing about 70 kg), and has a noticeable paunch. He has a pale, round face, a long nose, brown hair and yellow (sic; possibly hazel) eyes. He is a heavy smoker.
 - b. Deputy Chief - (Colonel) Gribanov, who later became chief of the Second Directorate of the GRU.
 - c. Chief of the American Section - (Colonel) Konlov. His deputy was (Lieutenant Colonel) Gribanenko.
 - d. Chief of the German (Fifth) Section - (Major) Pavilyev. This section was responsible for operations against the DDR and its representatives in the Soviet Union.
5. When the MVD and the MVD were merged in March 1953, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MVD ceased to exist. The First (Intelligence) Directorate of the GRU, became the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD, and the Second (Counterintelligence) Directorate of the GRU became the First Chief Directorate of the MVD.
6. 1c. and to Organizational Chart of the Second Chief Directorate of the INW after March 1952 (see page 6):
 - (1) Chief of the Second Chief Directorate - (Nachalnik Vtorogo Glavnogo Upravleniya, INW, USSR).

The Second Chief Directorate was composed of the following sub-divisions:

 - (a) The Secretariat - (Lieutenant Colonel) Gubarenko was chief. This section served

the needs of SCD personnel in both the top and the working echelons. Specifically, it was responsible for the checking and registry of secret and top secret documents of the SCD, the operation of the typing pool, the providing of stenographic help, the receipt and dispatch of diplomatic mail, and the handling of incoming correspondence and its distribution to the appropriate sections. Within the secretariat there was also a Housekeeping (Khozvaystvounnoye) Subsection which was charged with the custody of living quarters of the employees of the SCD while on duty abroad. Members of the secretariat also might be given various non-operational tasks by the chief of the directorate or his deputies. In addition, the chief of the secretariat kept the duty officer roster and appointed operational and staff duty officers for nights, non-working days, and holidays.

The following were operational sections performing regular intelligence functions:

- (3) First Section - American Section.
- (4) Second Section - Great Britain, its colonies, and the Commonwealth.
- (5) Third Section - Intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany and Austria.
- (6) Fourth Section - Continental Europe and Scandinavia, except Germany, Austria, and the satellites. Colonel Tsybal was chief of this section. Tsybal was approximately 40 years old, was short, and had red hair.
- (7) Fifth Section - Emigration. This section was responsible for placing agents within emigre groups.
- (8) Sixth Section - Near and Far East, except China, North Korea, and Mongolia. The chief was (Lieutenant) Colonel Kortiporokh.
- (9) Seventh Section - The Advisors' Section. Helped and exercised control over the state security organs of the European satellites, China, North Korea, and Mongolia. The chief was (Colonel) Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Bakharovskiy, with Colonel Chistovoyshiy as deputy.
- (10) Scientific and Technical Intelligence Section. The section chief was Kvaranikov (fnu).
- (11) Ninth Section - The Illegal Section (Otdel Neloegalov) - A section for the selection, preparation, and dispatching of deep cover agents for deep cover work abroad.
- (12) Tenth Section - Delegations and Merchant Seamen. The chief was Colonel Shorkin. This section handled the agents within Soviet delegations sent abroad and also directed the agents on Soviet merchant ships sailing to foreign ports. The network covered all vessels sailing abroad, and agents would be, as a rule, under cover as members of the crew. There was a regulation which stipulated that, when members of the merchant marine were abroad, they could go ashore alone and must be in groups of not less than three persons. While there would not necessarily be an INW man in the group, agents were alerted to keep an eye on shore parties. If one member of the group should break away, even for a few hours, he immediately would become suspect and would not get a second chance either to go ashore or to sail abroad again. For three persons to go ashore and get drunk together was not considered a serious offense. When a ship was bound for a foreign port, the resident of that country was notified by telegram from the Second Chief Directorate as to the date of the ship's arrival.
- (13) Information Section (number of section not known) - The chief of the section was (Colonel) Novoselov. Novoselov had been Chief of the Directorate of Information under the KT. In 1951, this directorate was known as the Fifth Directorate. When the INW was established it became the Information Section and continued as a section under the Second Chief Directorate of the INW. All intelligence information from abroad was forwarded to this section, where it was processed, put in report form or summarized, and then forwarded to the appropriate ministries or other government agencies which would be interested in

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
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it, if it warranted being so sent.

The following were so-called non-operational sections:

- (14) Code Section (Shifrovannyi Otdel) - This section was actually subordinate to the chief of the Second Chief Directorate; but, at the same time, organizationally, it was also under the chief of the Eighth Directorate ("D" on the chart), i.e., the Code Directorate. Physically, it was located next to the offices of the Second Chief Directorate, while the Eighth Directorate was located in a suburb of Moscow. The chief of this section, while nominally subordinate to the chief of the Eighth Directorate, was not allowed to show to the latter, or to other workers in the Eighth Directorate, any of the code messages he received for the Second Chief Directorate.
- (15) Operational Registry and Archives Sektor (Sektor Operativnogo Ucheta i Arkhiva) - Registry of active and of former agents; personnel composed of foreign nationals working abroad, registry of deep cover agents (polarnik) and of prospective agents being considered for or actually in the process of recruitment, custody of operational and personal agent files. This Sektor was also subordinate to both the chief of the Second Chief Directorate and the chief of the First Special Section, MVD, USSR ("C" on the chart). The official designation of this unit was "Fifth Sektor of the First Special Section, MVD, USSR." Its chief was Colonel Andreyev.
- (16) Finance and Disbursing Sektor (Finansovo-Valyutnyy Sektor) - The section chief was Colonel Vukobrevskiy. This unit also had dual subordination: to the chief of the Second Chief Directorate and to the chief of the Finance Section, MVD, USSR ("D" on the chart).
- (17) Personnel Section - Also subordinate to both the chief of the Second Chief Directorate and to the chief of the Personnel Directorate, MVD, USSR ("E" on the chart).
- (18) Courses of Foreign Languages - The instructors in this unit gave language instruction to the members of the Second Chief Directorate only. However, in academic matters, methodology, and guidance in the use of text books and training aids, they were subordinate to the chief of the Department of Foreign Languages of the Higher School of the MVD, USSR ("F" on the chart), at the present time called the Law Institute (Yuridicheskiy Institut).
- (19) The Party Committee (Partkom) - The Party Committee was not formally subordinated to the chief of the Second Chief Directorate. It was directly under the Party Committee, MVD, USSR ("A" on the chart). However, it was responsible for a joint, consultative effort (with the chief of the Second Chief Directorate) directed toward the improvement of Second Chief Directorate work in general.
- (20) Komsomol Committee - Supervised the Komsomol work in the directorate. However, since there were comparatively few members of the Komsomol in the directorate, and these were almost exclusively from among the ancillary and support personnel, the secretary of this committee performed these duties in addition to his other normal work and not on a full-time basis.

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Proposed Reorganization of the Second Chief Directorate

7. Approximately in the middle, or the beginning, of August 1953, Fanyushkin called a meeting of all chiefs of sections and the secretaries of the Party Bureaus of the Second Chief Directorate. The agenda of the meeting required that all of those present put forth their proposals on the subject of how to improve the organization of the work of the Directorate. Each one was requested to submit his own proposals on how to revamp the structure of the directorate for greater effectiveness. This question was posed on the grounds that Boriya, during his tenure as Minister (NM), disrupted the work of the Second Chief Directorate; unnecessarily discharged a large number of Second Chief Directorate employees, and put through a completely faulty reorganization of the Directorate.
8. The following is a list of specific proposals presented during the described meeting:
 - a. The American Section was to be made into two separate sections, i.e., one section to work against the United States only, and the other to work against Latin America.
 - b. The British Section was to be left without a change, except that Australia was to be transferred to the Far East Section.
 - c. The Austro-German Section was to remain as it was, but to be strengthened by the addition of four or five more workers.
 - d. With regard to the European Section, a proposal was made to break it up into three sections, i.e.:
 - 1) France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg;
 - 2) Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark;
 - 3) Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
 - e. The Emigration Section was to remain as it was, but with an addition of five or seven more employees.
 - f. With regard to the Sixth (Near and Far East) Section, there was a proposal to break it up into three separate sections, namely:
 - 1) Iran, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt;
 - 2) Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India;
 - 3) The Far East Section, to include Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Indo-China.
 - g. No changes were proposed with regard to the Advisers' Section, except that the chief of section asked for an increase in his T/O of five or six people.
 - h. No changes were proposed with regard to the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Section.
 - i. There were two major proposals with regard to the Deep Cover Section. One proposal was to make the section into a Deep Cover Directorate, within the Second Chief Directorate, to comprise three sections, which would be charged with all deep cover activities. The second proposal had in view the creation of three independent sections, as follows:
 - 1) A section charged with the selection and training of agents for deep cover work.

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- 2) A section charged with the legalization aspects of deep cover work, to include the documentation of agents and their dispatch or infiltration into the foreign countries for deep cover work.
 - 3) A section charged with the actual running of deep cover operations and the maintenance of contact with deep cover agents.
 - j. No changes were proposed with regard to the 10th (Delegation) Section.
 - k. With regard to the Information Section, it was proposed that it be considerably enlarged and that the Translators' Sektor be removed from its jurisdiction, since the direction of the work of translators required entirely too much time and effort on the section's part.
 - l. The next question raised at the meeting dealt with the proposal to return to Second Chief Directorate organizational control the subdivisions removed from the direct control of the former First Chief Directorate. Specifically:
 - 1) The Code Section - It was proposed that it be returned to full Second Chief Directorate control.
 - 2) Registry and Archives Sektor - The proposal called for its return to full Second Chief Directorate control and again raising it to a section.
 - 3) Finance and Disturbing Sektor - It was proposed to return it to full Second Chief Directorate control as a section.
 - m. No objections were raised with regard to the dual subordination of the Personnel Section (to the Second Chief Directorate and to the Personnel Directorate, MVD).
 - n. No changes were proposed with regard to the status of the Foreign Languages Courses.
- The measures listed above were not put into effect as of February 1954, i.e., before the Committee for State Security (KGB) was established. However, while probably not all of the proposals were finally adopted and implemented, it is fairly certain that some of them were carried out, especially those referring to the break-up of the European and the Near/Far East Sections. Such measures were necessary since the sections had grown too unwieldy to be run efficiently.
- The First Chief Directorate of the MVD after March 1953
- a. The First Chief Directorate was a CE directorate which was responsible for all foreigners within the Soviet Union. Its specific responsibilities were as follows:
 1. Counterespionage work against all foreign diplomatic installations and all foreigners legally in the Soviet Union. This work was handled by sections which were broken down by country as in the Second Chief Directorate.
 2. Apprehension of all foreign agents dispatched into the Soviet Union. This work was handled by the 11th Section, known as the Section for the Search of Paraculists (Резерв Парашутистов).
 3. Operational direction of the cases of all foreign agents apprehended in the Soviet Union. This may have been part of the work of the 11th Section or there may have been a special section just for this purpose.
 - b. The work of the 11th Section was a continuation of the work of the old wartime Fourth (Partisan) Directorate. This section inherited the Partisan Directorate's name but it probably was much smaller now than it was during the war. The 11th Section may have had a small group in each oblast and kray MVD directorate.
 - c. The First Chief Directorate did not maintain personnel abroad. The only circumstance under which a First Chief Directorate case officer might have gone abroad would have been operational necessity. For example, if a case officer of the American Section of the First Chief Directorate became friendly with an American in the Embassy and the American returned to Washington, this case officer might have been transferred to

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Washington if they thought that a continuation of the friendship might have valuable results. However, under such circumstances the case officer would have been temporarily transferred to the Second Chief Directorate and the case would have become a Second Chief Directorate case. Source knows of no foreign operations in which First Chief Directorate personnel have actually participated.

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(Der Tagesordnungspunkt 1 hatte besonders die Arbeit im allgemeinen, Kaderfragen und organisatorische Fragen zum Inhalt.)

Zeit der Sitzung:

Die Sitzung begann 10:30 und endete etwa 15:30 Uhr.

Zu Tagesordnungspunkt 1 und 2

Der Leiter des HR, Nicola Wolf, eröffnete die Dienstbesprechung und fuhrte aus: Die Arbeitspläne für das I. Quartal 1953 habe er nicht rechtlich bindungsmässig erhalten. Einen Teil der erhaltenen Pläne habe er zurück geben müssen, da sie formell waren. Überhaupt sei der grösste Teil der Pläne des Hauses formell. Die Arbeitspläne müssten operative Pläne sein und alles beinhalten. Ferner müssten verstehen alle Kräfte unserer Abteilung richtig zu mobilisieren. Viele Mitarbeiter des Hauses wurden bei ihren täglichen Arbeiten sich verzettelt und die Massnahmen zur Erreichung der gesteckten Ziele ganz vergessen bzw. aus acht lassen.

Amessert, wichtig in unserer Arbeit sei den Aufbau der Residenturen bei der Suche nach Einsatzfeldern. In Residenturen wurde kaum die Ausbildung gehandhabt. Voraussetzungen für eine Einschulung und Aufnahme für eine Spinnarbeit wurden nicht mitgeteilt. Bei der Auswahl eines Vertriebsortes wurde erst wenn die Ausbildung laufend nicht einhalten werden konnte.

Bei ausgebildeten und eingeschulsten Residenten soll man nicht den Fehler machen diese sich 3 Wochenlang legalisieren lassen. Die eingeschulsten Residenten sollen sich ausser einer Legalisierung sofort anfangen allmählich zu arbeiten. Bei der Organisation von Residenturen soll man sich nicht zu sehr auf die Bereitstellung von Quellen durch die Zentrale verlassen. Es sei der Fehler gemacht worden, dass bei der Ausbildung der Residenten gesagt wurde, die erforderlichen Quellen werde die Zentrale bereitstellen. Dies sei in Zukunft zu unterlassen. Die Residenten sollen in der Suche nach Quellen selbst aktiv sein. Selbstverpflichtungsmassnahmen von der Zentrale aus auch nach Kriegsausbruch nur bis zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt einer Residentur anzuschliessen. Grundsatz sei aber, dass sich die Residenten selbst be-
massen.

Die Arbeit der Abteilungen und der Mitarbeiter muss systematischer gestaltet werden, das heißt, dass das zu bearbeitende Objekt studiert werden muss. Dies soll voraussetzt in der Schaffung von Anhaltspunkten fuer die Werbung von Quellen, wie z.B. in den Ministerien der Bonner - Regierung.

2.2.2. besitze das IWP wenige politische Nachrichten und fast keine ökonomische Nachrichten. Die wenigen Nachrichten, die uns z.2.2. zur Verfügung stehen reichen nicht, um unsere Regierung und Forderung ausreichend zu informieren. Wir besitzen deshalb nochmals, dass die Berücksichtigung von Schwerpunkt in unseren Arbeitsplänen sinnesser notwendig sein könnte ferner, dass bei der Durchführung der Arbeit b

Um in Zukunft schneller und besser vorwärts zu kommen, bzw. den Sicherheitsfaktor stärker werten zu lassen, ist folgendes notwendig:

a) Konkrete Arbeitspläne, einschliesslich gut durchdachter Legendes, dies ist die Grundlage unserer Arbeit. Die gemachten Fehler der Vergangenheit zeigten dies eindeutig.

(Ich spreche hierbei an folgende Vorkommnisse erinnern: Fall Planet, -1. Abteilung
Verhaftung eines Beauftragten der 2. Abteilung durch die VP an der Grenze, Beschü-
nung eines Grenzküriers der 2. Abteilung durch die Grenzpolizei der DDR, das Ver-
gehen der Agenten der 1. HA im vergangenen Jahr, der Fall Weiss -1. Abteilung, die B

b) Die Partei SED ist bei unserer Arbeit aus dem Spiel zu lassen

IV-6: *(Continued)*

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Der Grundsatz hier ist: Mitarbeiter des Hauptabteilungsleiters sind die Partei kompromittiert. Sie haben sich unter anderen als Mitarbeiter eines ZK der SED legitim und zwar bei Vorkommnissen hierfür nicht geeignet, wenn man gesagt, viele Mitarbeiter reisten auf Kosten des ZK der SED als Legende, obwohl Walter Ulbricht streng verboten hat, dass wir die Partei für unsere Arbeit nutzen, bzw. die Organe der Partei betreten. Nur einer sehr geringen Anzahl - ca. 6 - Mitarbeitern standen ZK-Ausweise mit der Unterschrift von Otto Schöen von Wartburg zur Verfügung. Diese Ausweise fügte das ZK am 12. 11. 1952 Mitarbeitern ZK-Ausweise beizugeben. Ende März 1953 wurde hiermit radikal Schluss gemacht.

c) Alle geworbenen Agenten, Residenten, Kuriers, Ablagestellen, Treffungen, Deckrede usw. müssen ausserordentlich gewissenhaft und genau überliefert werden. Nicht nur eine ausserordentliche Hebungsforderung durchzuführen, so denn tief in das Innere eindringen. Verwandtschaft, Umgebung, Frau und Kinder besonders der Verkehr usw. ausserordentlich gewissenhaft abgeklärt werden. Wenn wir alles sehr gewissenhaft durchzuführen, so konnten wir gewisse sein, dass wir sehr wenig Rückschlüsse erlitten wurden. Auch schlaue sei überwiegend die Ursache leichtsinniger Arbeit.

d) Die Verantwortung für die Arbeit trägt der Hauptabteilungsleiter sowie der Abteilungsleiter. Wolf fügte hier hinzu, dass Ansicht verschiedener Abteilungsleiter, dass die Verantwortung für die Arbeit bei der Leitung liegt, nicht richtig sei. Verantwortlich ist in erster Linie der Abteilungsleiter, und dann erst die Leitung. Ebenfalls trägt jeder Mitarbeiter für eigenständige Arbeit die Verantwortung. Die Mitarbeiter müssen so erzogen werden, dass Aufrichtigkeit in allen dienstlichen und privaten Angelegenheiten ausserordentlich Grundgesetz ist.

e) Ausnutzung aller sich ergebenden Möglichkeiten für unsere Geheimdienstarbeit. Wolf ging hierbei nochmals auf die Ausarbeitung guter Legenden ein. Diese Legende müsse alle objektiven und subjektiven Möglichkeiten beinhalten. Z.B. nicht nur reine Lebenslegende sondern auch Fragen wie Verhaftung, Befragung, politische Auseinandersetzungen usw. Hierher gehört auch das Verhalten bei Bekanntschaft mit westlichen Agenten, z.B. in der Abwehr, in der Zusammenarbeit mit Agenten der westlichen Parteien usw.

f) Aufgaben/Werbung von Quellen durch die Residenten. Wie bereits zum Ausdruck gebracht, sollen die Residenten sich nach Möglichkeit an der Suche nach Quellen stark beteiligen. Wenn der Resident nach Westdeutschland eingeschleust wird und in der DDR der SED angehört hat, darf er keine Werbung von Agenten nicht durchführen. Alle übrigen Residenten, die nicht eingeschleust sind, sowie in Westdeutschland geworbenen können nach Bestätigung durch die Zentrale von Fall zu Fall Werbungen durchführen. Eingeschleuste SED-Residenten haben nun mit zugeordneten Quellen zu arbeiten.

g) Die Anleitung der Mitarbeiter durch die Abteilungsleiter. Das Benehmen der Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter gegenüber den Mitarbeitern muss korrekt und diszipliniert sein. Es darf sich kein Kampelton entwickeln. Die Mitarbeiter müssen untereinander und auch vor dem Abteilungsleiter Achtung haben. Alle Vorhaben und Arbeiten müssen mit den Mitarbeitern durch den Abteilungsleiter gründlich besprochen werden. Die Abteilungsleiter sind für Arbeit und für die Sicherheit ganz und gar verantwortlich. Letzteres nicht nur für die Arbeit in der Abteilung sondern auch für die Mitarbeiter. Es muss in der Abteilung eine schöpferische Arbeit entwickelt werden.

Die Punkte a - g stellten Ergänzungen zu den bereits bekannten Methoden dar.

Micha Wolf fuhr sodann in seinen Ausführungen wie folgt fort:

In dieser Arbeit sollen wir in der Abklärung von Personen usw. sowie auch in der Abklärung von Objekten einige Auskünfte erlangen und dabei vorerst in Anspruch nehmen, dass die Informationen, die wir in diesen Abklärungen beifügen, die eigentliche Spionagearbeit nicht so sehr gründlich vorbereiten, alles muss gründlich studiert werden. Jeder Mitarbeiter muss auf seinem Gebiet legale und halblegale Nachrichten beständig sammeln und systematisch sammeln.

Wolf hat zusammen alle Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter nochmals der IV. HA westliche Informations aus Westdeutschland zu überlassen. Das ganze IWF wurde davon in Kenntnis gesetzt.

Wenn bestimmte Mitarbeiter aller Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter die Erlaubnis, der Mitarbeiter einfluss sollen keine Nebensächliche Arbeit machen, sondern sie müssen stetig mit der Arbeit vertraut gemacht werden. Wenn dies unser Mitarbeiter feststellen, so werden sie sich doppelt anstrengen.

Nach diesen Ausführungen ging Wolf auf die Arbeit der einzelnen Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen über. Er sagte:

I. Hauptabteilung.

Die I. HA sei sehr im Rückstand. Die Schwierigkeiten seien der Leitung des IWF bekannt. Man hoffe jedoch, dass das kein Dauerzustand bleibt. Der erlittene Rückschlag müsse doch zum bald Überwinden sein. Innerer Erfüllung des Arbeitsplanes im Quartal 1953 sehe er - Wolf - sich sehr schwer, da hierfür viele Voraussetzungen fehlen und wir schließlich schon Ende Februar schreiben.

Henschke gab darauf folgende Erklärung an:

Die Schwierigkeiten mit der I. Hauptabteilung sind zu eingehen sind der Lei bekannt. Ebenfalls kommt die Leitung die Metersorgen der Hauptabteilung. Hier mein Henschke, dass er keine richtigen Mitarbeiter besitzt, es fehlen die geistigen Voraussetzungen. Er hoffe jedoch, dass er die Schwierigkeiten in beald überwinden habe. Die Arbeitsplanerfüllung bereite ihm ohne Zweifel Schwierigkeiten, dennoch, er seinen Arbeitsplan einbringen zu erfüllen. Henschke fragte ferner aus, dass sich von den Arbeitsbesprechungen auch einen Erfahrungsaustausch erhoffe, wie z.B.

über die Organisation von Grenzübergängen, Legalisierung von Residenten in Westdeutschland usw. Er habe den Eindruck, dass jeder Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter über gesammelte Erfahrungen sich anschaut. Diese Methode sei doch unheimlich. Der eine Mitarbeiter habe immer der andere dort grosse Erfahrungen über die Erfahrungen müsse man doch berücksichtigen. Er kenne z.B. in seiner Hauptabteilung nicht mit seinen Grenzübergängen voran. Seine Abteilungen haben diesbezüglich viele Schwierigkeiten. Es sei ihm jedoch bekannt, dass die II. HA auf diesem Gebiet etwas folgen zu verfahren habe. Wenn dies der Fall ist, so soll doch die II. HA die Erfahrungen austauschen. Die II. HA könne vielleicht auf einem anderen Gebiet helfen.

Wolf erwiderte hierauf, dass man sich hierüber noch in der Leitung unterhalten zu muss die Konspiration berücksichtigen. Ebenfalls müsse man diese Frage noch den Beratern besprechen.

II. Hauptabteilung.

Die II. HA wurde voraussichtlich als einzige HA ihren Plan für das I. Quartal 1953 erfüllen. Es müsste jedoch hinzugefügt werden, dass Zinda (HA-Leiter der II.) seinen Arbeitsplan erst Anfang Februar eingereicht habe. Erst hätte Zinda ein Telegramm - Plan eingereicht, auf den er zurück bekam und dann hatte er mehrmals erwähnt werden müssen, bis der Plan tatsächlich vorgelegt wurde. Zinda müsse für die Zukunft merken, Termin sei Termin und damit Befehl. Sonst müsse er - Wolf - jedoch zum Ausdruck bringen, dass die II. HA sehr fleissig gearbeitet habe und vi schon gesagt, als einzige Hauptabteilung bzw. Abteilung ihren Plan aktuell wird. Zur II. HA sei ferner zu sagen, dass sie bei ihrer Arbeit nicht das Objekt unserer Acht lassen soll. Die Arbeit müsse planmässiger gestaltet werden. Bei der II. HA scheint es so zu sein, dass alles was anfallt genommen wird. Dies sei zwar augenblicklich richtig, müsse aber unbedingt geändert werden, es könne sich um eine unsystematische Arbeit entwickeln. Ebenfalls müssten in der II. HA bestimmte spor

Zuege verfallen (Wolf schätzte die Arbeit der 1. Abteilung sehr hoch, da er als Ausserordentlich in der Leitung und in der Arbeit des Personals der 1. Abteilung, dass wir das Objekt Berstein - Thordike - sehr gut und gründlich bearbeitet hätten; da hier eine sehr sehr gute Sache aufgebaut werden konnte.

1. Abteilung

Über die Arbeit der 1. Abteilung äusserte sich Wolf sehr wenig. Die 1. Abteilung wurde im Februar noch von dem Genossen Felix vertreten unter direkter Anleitung Michas Wolf. Wolf machte lediglich die Bemerkung, dass er über den Stand der Arbeit unterrichtet sei. Er erwähnte noch etwas vor sich hin, was er zu entnehmen war, dass die Arbeit in der 1. Abteilung nur kleine Erfolge zu verzeichnen habe, und es wäre doch noch nicht so mit der Arbeit vorgeht, als man sich das vorgestellt hätte. (Ich möchte hier hinzufügen, dass die 1. Abteilung Anfang März einen neuen Abteilungsleiter vom Ministerium für Staatssicherheit bekommen hat.)

2. Abteilung

Wolf brachte zum Ausdruck, dass die 2. Abteilung am schwierigsten zu überwachen in ihrer Arbeit. Die 2. Abteilung hatte in letzter Zeit einige operative Fehler gemacht, was in Zukunft verfallen müsse. Die Abteilung sei jetzt mit 3 operativen Mitarbeitern und einer Sekretärin besetzt und müsse doch in ihrer Arbeit voranschreiten. Wolf meinte ferner, dass er die Schwierigkeit der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Spionagearbeit kenne, aber die Arbeit müsse fortgesetzt werden, um die Land heranzukommen.

Der Abteilungsleiter der 2. Abteilung, Heinrich Weiberg, äusserte hierauf folgendes: Die Leitung wisse ganz genau, wie schwierig die Arbeit seiner Abteilung ist. Er habe zwar 3 Mitarbeiter, aber nur einer von diesen drei Mitarbeitern und zwar Willi Neumann, sei ein wirklich operativer Kraft. Über Kollegen und Sekretärin äusserte er sich nicht besonders lobend. Besonders die negative Haltung zu Peter, Kurt, ersten Gebiete der Wissenschaft Spezialkräfte benötige. Mit seinen jetzigen Mitarbeitern könne er keinesfalls die gestellten Aufgaben lösen. Er selbst müsse die operativen Aufgaben, viele wissenschaftliche und technische Aufgaben, die in den anderen Abteilungen der IIR hätten, nicht mit derartigen Schwierigkeiten bewältigen. Er führe als Beispiel die 1. Hauptabteilung an und erlaube, dass die politische Aufgaben von den Mitarbeitern auf Grund ihrer Ausbildung, doch geleistet werden können. In seiner Abteilung würden andere Voraussetzungen erwartet. Er bat deshalb die Kaderabteilung dafür zu sorgen, dass die Abteilung schnellstens eine Verstärkung von Wissenschaftlern und Technikern bekomme, um die gestellten Aufgaben in Zukunft einigermaßen lösen zu können. Die Arbeitspläne der Abteilung für das 1. Quartal seien für die 2. Abteilung schwer, es werde aber alles daran gesetzt, um das Maximale an Denkbaren zu erreichen. Der sowjetische Berater Bronski sei vollkommen über die Lage in der Abteilung informiert. Auch diesen habe er gebeten, dass er sich bei Eug. Michas Wolf, sagte zu den Ausführungen des Weiberg abschliessend folgendes: Er verkenne keinesfalls die besondere Lage der 2. Abteilung. Es werde seitens der Leitung alles getan, um aus der 2. Abteilung die gewünschte Abteilung zu entwickeln. Die Abteilung müsse aber Verständnis dafür haben, dass die Kaderabteilung des II keine Kader becken könne. - Betreffs Kaderfrage siehe 3. Abteilung.

3. Abteilung - Kaderabteilung

Am schärfsten griff Wolf die Kaderabteilung an. Der Hauptvorwurf bestand darin, dass die 3. Abteilung nicht organisiert wurde. Man warte wohl vor, dass er auf Kader sowie Abteilungen beschweren, dass sie Eingaben über Kader überhaupt nicht für die Arbeitseinteilung und Vorbereitungen in das Gebiet der "un durchsicht". Der Arbeitsplan der 3. Abteilung sei unkonkret und nicht richtig durchsicht.

Man möchte Willi wohl den Vorwurf machen, dass er zu burokratisch sei. Wohl verteidigte sich damit, dass er zu Ausdruck brachte, die Mitarbeiter müssten nicht alles die Verantwortung bei Einstellungen, Kaderfragen usw. haben, wenn sie nicht bei Kaderfragen mit dieser wohl den Rat aus seiner Verteidigung ferner an, dass die Betriebe, Verwaltungsstellen und sonstige Institutionen nicht verpflichtet ihre Kaderarbeit erfüllen und dadurch bei Kaderuche sich grosse Schwierigkeiten sei. Wie schwierig es ist, geeignete Kader zu finden, koenne man sich kaum denken. Es sei ja alles schon abgemacht. Wohl hat in diesem Zusammenhang alle Hauptabteilungen - Abteilungsleiter ebenfalls in der Kaderuche behilflich zu sein, denn und werden auch viele Kader füglich durch die Finger gehen. Besonders hat er uns 14.10.1946/1946 geeignete Finger zu finden.

In der Kaderfrage ergriß sodann Zsinda das Wort und erklärte, dass die Kaderabteilung Verständnis für die Operativen Abteilungen haben müsse. Seine Hauptabteilung besaße nur 7 operative Mitarbeiter eine Sekretärin. Bei einem derartigen Zustand müsse die Arbeit darunter leiden. Ebenfalls bekäme er eingereichte Kadervorschläge an die Kaderabteilung überhaupt nicht zurück. Entscheidungen wurde die Kaderabteilung überhaupt nicht fällen. Die Abteilungen wollten doch vor allem wissen, wie sie sich in bestimmten Kaderfragen zu verhalten haben. Die Kaderabteilung müsse nun endlich dazu übergehen, schnell Entscheidungen zu treffen. Wie sei doch den Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen gleich, aber sie wüssten wenigstens voran sie sich wenn eine Entscheidung, infolge der Verantwortung, nicht gleich möglich ist, so soll man doch wenigstens zwischenabsehen gehen.
Diesen Standpunkt teilte sodann auch Benacke.
Nach dieser Diskussion erhielt wohl vom Leiter des INF den Auftrag, die Arbeit in seiner Abteilung zu sichern. Ziel muss sein, schnellere Entscheidung in allen Kaderfragen.

4. Abteilung - Archiv -

Wolf machte alle drei Abteilungsleiter darauf aufmerksam, dass die Aktenführung in vielen Fällen noch zu wünschen übrig lasse. Dies kam auch für die Registrierung von Mitarbeitern ~~mit~~ in Frage. Ein Mangel bestünde auch in der Übergabe von Akten an andere Mitarbeiter innerhalb der Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen. Die fehlte sehr oft die Umregistrierung sowie die Anfertigung des erforderlichen ~~mit~~ Protokolls. Kontrollen der Genossen Ewald Becker hatten dies fast überall gezeigt. Wolf erteilte hierauf Ewald Becker das Wort. Sie sagte:

Da fuer die Leitung und die Freunde - Russen - jederzeit einen Ueberblick zu haben, ist es einfach eine ausserordentlich dringende Notwendigkeit, dass die operativen Mitarbeiter ihre Aktienfuehrung in Ordnung haben. Sie betonte ferner, dass sie in Zukunft des bei offizieren in den Abteilungen Kontrollen durchfuehren werde, um zu sehen, ob alles den Anordnungen entsprechen gemacht wird. Becker ging dann zu der Frage zur Registratur von Kader mit operativer Interesse ueber. - Ich moechte erlautern, wissu Sie, dass es sich hierbei um Kader handelt, die fuer die Abteilungen von besonderer Interesse sind, aber noch ~~keine~~ keine Werbungsabsichten bestehen. - Fuer derartige Kader sollen die Abteilungen eine sogenannte Hinweisakte fuehren. In dieser Hinweisakte soll, auch die Registrierung, erfolgen, also innerhalb der Hauptabteilung bei den Abteilungen sowie bei den selbststaendigen Abteilungen. Kader fuer die kein Interesse mehr besteht, sollen in das Archiv abgegeben werden. Das Archiv wird ebenfalls eine derartige Hinweisakte (Akt) fuehren ohne dabei eine Sperrkarte oder sonstige Karte zu anlegen. Die Kader werden wie bei den Abteilungen innerhalb der Hinweisakte gefuehrt. Man sei noch bei der Ueberlegung, ob man fuer derartige immerhin wichtige Kader eine besondere Karte anlegen soll. Die Freunde e seien jedoch dagegen und vertreten den Standpunkt, entweder ist der Kader so wichtig, dass man mit ihm arbeitet oder aber er ist ein Agent. In beiden Faellen muessen ja sowieso Sperrkarten angelegt werden. Die uebrigen Kader seien nicht so wichtig, dass man eine Karte anlegt, selbst wenn sie einmal fuer das JWR von operativen Interesse waren. In der darauf folgenden Diskussion brachte vor allem Zinda zum Ausdruck, dass die Grossen Becker ihre ~~Werbung~~ Werbung moechte, damit keine unetzte Arbeitszeit in die Buerokratie verwendet wird. (Zinda war sehr gegen Emel Becker eingestellt).

Micha Wolf bekräftigte die Ausführungen der Becker und machte darauf aufmerksam, dass wir in unseren Abteilungen auch auf dem Gebiet der Aktenführung gründlich sein sollen. (X)

Micha Wolf ging sodann über auf organisatorische Fragen und sprach sich mit uns über die erfolgreiche Gehaltsregelung. Die ganz hohen Gehälter wurden vermutlich etwas gedreht, die mittleren Gehälter blieben im grossen und ganzen an den bisherigen Hohestellungen. Die niedrigeren Gehälter, wie Referenten usw. wurden teilweise etwas steigen.

Die Gehaltsstruktur erfolge nach ganz anderen Richtlinien als bisher. (Ich komme hierauf zurück).

Ende Februar 1953 bekam das INF für die Hauptabteilungsleiter, Abteilungsleiter und Abteilungsmitarbeiter Staatssicherheitsausweise. Diese Ausweise wurden nur für den Dienstgebrauch benutzt werden und nur dann, wenn es die Lage erfordert. Nicht jedem Mitarbeiter soll ohne grosser Legitimation unserer Mitarbeiter gearbeitet werden, es nicht aufzufallen. Die Ausweise des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit haben auch bei den Hauptabteilungsleitern zu liegen. Die Ausweise wurden uns zur Dienststellung entsprechend der Neueinstellung ausgestellt werden. Die übrigen Mitarbeiter des INF bekamen ebenfalls im März 1953 Dienstausweise der Kripo. Diese Ausweise ersetzen zusätzlich sogenannte Dienstaufträge von der L. ausgestellt werden. Wolf machte nochmals darauf aufmerksam, dass diese Ausweise keinesfalls als Legitimationsunterlagen für unsere Person gefolgt werden sind und nicht anders zu behandeln.

(X) Erregung in Abteilung - siehe oben.

Für alle neu eingestellten Genossen will Willi Becker die Belehrung über die Aktenführung selbst übernehmen. Die Abteilungsleiter brauchen sich nur damit darum kümmern, dass diese neuen Mitarbeiter ihre Aktenführung richtig durchführen.

Zu Tagesordnungspunkt 3 - Ansprache des sowjetischen Charberaters Eugen-
Obwohl Eugen keine eigene Dolmetscherin mit hatte, musste aber der Hauptabteilungsleiter Hensche als Dolmetscher fungieren.

Er sprach:

Das INF sei verantwortlich für die Parteiführung und die Staatsführung der DDR. Alle Vorgänge politisch, ökonomisch, wissenschaftlich und technisch, militärisch und abwehrmässig einheitlicher Interesse - Natur in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik zu unterrichten. Diese geheime Nachrichtenarbeit sei notwendig, damit die Partei und die Regierung wichtige Beschlüsse fassen und in der Frage der Einheit Deutschlands eine richtige Politik betreiben. Es sei die Aufgabe jedes einzelnen Mitarbeiters und besonders Aufgabe der Hauptabteilungs- und Abteilungsleiter sowie der Leitung d. INF die ganze Arbeit darauf einzurichten. Bei jeder Arbeit die wir entfassen, muss jeder Mitarbeiter das oben Aufgesetzte klar als Ziel vor sich haben und die ganze Arbeit darauf einrichten. Dies muss in allen Fragen und Arbeiten der Ausgangspunkt sein. Wenn es auch hier und da noch Schwächen und Mängel gibt, die Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen müssen sich in ihren Plänen konkrete Aufgaben stellen, wie z.B. was das Deutschlandbesuch von Dulles besprochen usw. Ein Teil der Mitarbeiter des INF beschäftigen sich nebenbei mit organisatorischen Aufgaben. Derartige org. auf müssen ebenfalls erledigt werden. Das INF habe erst die ersten Stufen der Nachrichtenarbeit erklommen und halbwegs vollständig heute noch nicht in der Lage alles in Westdeutschland zu wissen, aber es wird nur noch eine kurze Zeit dauern und wir werden bei systematischer Arbeit gut voran kommen. Es muss unsere Aufgabe sein in Westdeutschland alles durcheinander zu bringen auf Grund guter Nachrichten. Es so sollten wir unsere Arbeit betrachten, denn die Auswertung unserer Nachrichten werden schon die entsprechenden Massnahmen mit sich bringen. Die Hauptabteilungs- und Abteilungsleiter hatten bereits eine gute Nachrichtenerfahrung. Diese Erfahrung

musse jedoch in Zukunft besser als in der Vergangenheit ausgenutzt werden. Alle un-
denkbaren Möglichkeiten müssen für unsere Arbeit ausgenutzt werden. Wir werden
damit uns Deutsche - können doch die deutschen Verhältnisse besser als die, wenn
ihnen möglich ist in Indien, Süd-Amerika, USA usw. einzudringen, so wird es uns als
Deutsche doch möglich sein in die Bundesrepublik einzudringen. Für die Hauptabtei-
leiter und Abteilungsleiter darf nicht nur die Frage der Erziehung unserer Mitarbe-
iter stehen, sondern es muss gleichzeitig die Arbeit durchgehend sein. Denn das ist
am allerersten wichtig. Die Genossen Zacharia und Henschke haben immer wieder betont, bei
offenen Diskussionen in den monatlichen Sitzungen die Konspiration verliert. Die
Konspiration sei ausser Haus richtig, aber bei derartigen Sitzungen, wie sie im
des IWF selbst, solle man die Konspiration nicht überbetonen. Beispielsweise könne
man in derartigen Besprechungen wie heute die Probleme der Schwierigkeiten bereits
ruhig behandeln, man brauche ja nicht das letzte in allen Fällen zu haben. Ein grosser
Mangel im IWF bestünde darin, dass die Leitung selbst keine Aufgabenteilung vor-
nimmt. Nicht nur in den Arbeitsplänen der Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen müssen
Aufgaben und Schwerpunkte stehen, sondern die Leitung des IWF muss den Hauptabteilungen
und Abteilungen bestimmte Aufgaben und Schwerpunkte stellen. Die Durchführung der
Kontrolle von der Leitung über die Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter bis
zu den Mitarbeitern müsse auch noch besser durchgeführt werden, als sie es jetzt noch
schwach ist. Kritik und Selbstkritik müsse auch im IWF noch besser durchgeführt werden.
Erst durch eine gesunde Kritik und Selbstkritik könne es zu einer gesunden und ent-
wicklungsreichen Nachrichtenarbeit werden. Wir sollten den Beschluss des ZK der SED über
Entwicklung von Kritik und Selbstkritik nochmals durcharbeiten. Es muss sein
Ausführungen, indem er nochmals darauf aufmerksam machte, dass wir alles daran setzen
müssten, die Parteilichkeit und die Staatlichkeit mit den besten Nachrichten zu
sehen, um eben eine richtige Politik zu betreiben. Unsere Arbeit würde nicht nur d-
"DDR" stärken sondern das gesamte Weltfriedenslager.

Zu Punkt 4 der Tagesordnung - Diskussion und Schlusswort.

Die Diskussion habe ich bereits in den Tagesordnungspunkten 1 und 2 eingebaut, so-
ich hierauf nicht noch einmal eingehen brauche. Nebensächliche Diskussionen habe
ich weggelassen.

Micha Wolf brachte abschliessend zum Ausdruck, dass er hoffe, dass auch die heutige
Sitzung dazu beigetragen habe, die Arbeit in Zukunft zu verbessern und vor allem vor-
zutreiben. Hauptaufgabe in den letzten Quartalswochen sei die Erhaltung des Arbei-
planes. Alle Möglichkeiten müssten restlos ausgenutzt werden um unsere Pläne zu
füllen. Er stünde allen Hauptabteilungsleitern und Abteilungsleitern zur Verfügung
um sich zeigende Schwierigkeiten operativ und formell zu überwinden zu helfen.
Die Wachsamkeit lege er allen nochmals sehr nahe.

Bevor ich mit der eigentlichen Arbeit der Nachforschungen über die Vorgeschichte
zu diesem Zusammenhang übergehe, möchte ich zunächst einige allgemeine Bemerkungen

Wie bekannt, wurde Stalin am 21.3.1953 am 75. Geburtstag zum 50. Todestag von Lenin in eine Veran-
staltung eingeladen, die in der Großen Halle des
über diesen Tag in der Großen Halle des
In diesem Jahr (1953) wurde Stalin 53 Jahre alt.
Stalin war im Jahr 1953 ein Mann, der
als gewöhnliche Personlichkeit mit
Einkommens und brennen sich (Stalin war
Teil des gewöhnlichen Lebens, das
zu einer kleinen Niedrigkeit wurde
Am 7.3.53 ergriffte sich unabhängig
hierzu folgendes:

Russ. 14.10 Uhr. Das von Bombardement verursachte Lärm- und Rauchgeschwärm der Leistungsspannwerke des IAE
verhinderte das Weiterkommen in die Halle. Es wurde eine
Entscheidung in Begleitung eines IAE-Mitglieds getroffen, dass
das IAE-Mitglied, das den Auftrag hatte, die Halle zu betreten,
sollte die Halle betreten und den Auftrag ausführen. Die Halle wurde
betreten. Die Halle wurde betreten. Die Halle wurde betreten.
Obwohl es 14.10 Uhr war, waren die ersten unter Tage waren diese erst
gegen 12.15 Uhr in die Halle gekommen. Die Halle wurde betreten.
Mikha Wolz, der um 15.00 Uhr in die Halle gekommen war, wurde
mit dem Leiter des IAE-Mitglieds zusammengebracht.

Es waren anwesend:

Micha Wolf, Leiter des INF

1. Hauptabteilung
Henschke, Herbert, Leiter
Schönheim, Alfred, Abteilungsleiter
Walla, Fritz, Abteilungsleiter
Willschek, Franz
Bergung, Adolf, Abteilungsleiter
Brecht, Fritz, Abteilungsleiter
König, Heinrich, Abteilungsleiter
Steinmann, Julius, Abteilungsleiter
Jendek, Fritz, Abteilungsleiter
Jocke, Fritz, Abteilungsleiter
Kühnemann, Wilhelm, Abteilungsleiter
Siegfried, Wilhelm, Abteilungsleiter

[illegible]

Mr. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

IV. Hauptabschnitt 3
Hauptabschnitt 3

I. Abteilung

SECRET

100-443887-100

Lang, Charles

Mr. [REDACTED]

1. Abbe-Linn

Heinrich Heine

REMARKS:

St. Peter, Winchester

3. Abteilung

3. Abteilung:
Wahl: Wöhl, Abteilungsleiter
Peter Scheib, stellv.

4. Abteilung

4. Abteilung
Emmi Becker, Abteilungsleiter

Diersow, Berater
Eugen, Chefberater
Dolmetscherin,
Berater I. HA.
Berater II. HA., Margaschew,
Berater III. HA., Bronski,
Berater IV. HA.,
Berater 1. Abteilung,
Berater 2. Abteilung, Bronski,
Berater 3. Abteilung.

Zeildauer der Sitzung:

Zeitdauer der Sitzung:
Etwa 16.00 Uhr bis 16.30 Uhr.

Die Sitzung wurde geleitet von Micha Wolf. Wolf sprach auch als Einziger.
Er fuhrte aus:

Die aussergewöhnliche Sitzung sei aus bestimmten Gründen notwendig. Die operativen Mitarbeiter aller Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen haben mit Hilfe ihrer Agenten ab sofort folgendes ~~Festzustellen~~ in Westberlin und Westdeutschland festzustellen:

1. Die Reaktion auf Stalins Tod,
2. die Reaktion auf die Regierungsumbildung in der SU. nach Stalins Tod,
3. der wahre Grund des Abzuges der DDR-Einschalinge mit alliierten Ringzügen aus Westberlin nach Westdeutschland.

[illegible][illegible]

In Zusammenhang mit den Fluchtversuchen der russischen Fluchtlinge, die in der Nacht vom 13. auf den 14. März 1953 aus der Sowjetunion in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland flüchteten, wurde in der Sitzung vom 13. März 1953 eine Abmahnung von einer derartigen Sitzung, am Nachmittag die Berichte waren erst am Vormittag - einige von ihnen selbst bis 11.30 Uhr - und wussten nichts von einer derartigen wichtigen Besprechung am Nachmittag. Ich selbst hatte bis Mittag mit dem russischen Berater vergesprochen, eine Besprechung über den Fall Engelhardt, Vereshchov hatte nicht die geringste Ahnung von einer bevorstehenden Sitzung. Dieser Eindruck hatte nicht nur ich von den russischen Mitarbeitern, sondern auch von den deutschen Mitarbeitern, die sich in der Zentralverwaltung in Karlsruhe am 13. März 1953 am Nachmittag selbst aus dem Urlaub zurückgekehrt waren. Die russische Seite, wie diese Sitzung stattgefunden hat, ist selbst die größte Bestätigung, dass die russischen Mitarbeiter in der Zentralverwaltung in Karlsruhe am 13. März 1953 am Nachmittag selbst aus dem Urlaub zurückgekehrt waren. Die russische Seite, wie diese Sitzung stattgefunden hat, ist selbst die größte Bestätigung, dass die russischen Mitarbeiter in der Zentralverwaltung in Karlsruhe am 13. März 1953 am Nachmittag selbst aus dem Urlaub zurückgekehrt waren.

Meine Bemerkungen zu dieser Sitzung in der Sitzung vom 13. März 1953. Wir, noch die Russen, hatten am Morgen des 13. März eine Abmahnung von einer derartigen Sitzung, am Nachmittag die Berichte waren erst am Vormittag - einige von ihnen selbst bis 11.30 Uhr - und wussten nichts von einer derartigen wichtigen Besprechung am Nachmittag. Ich selbst hatte bis Mittag mit dem russischen Berater vergesprochen, eine Besprechung über den Fall Engelhardt, Vereshchov hatte nicht die geringste Ahnung von einer bevorstehenden Sitzung. Dieser Eindruck hatte nicht nur ich von den russischen Mitarbeitern, sondern auch von den deutschen Mitarbeitern, die sich in der Zentralverwaltung in Karlsruhe am 13. März 1953 am Nachmittag selbst aus dem Urlaub zurückgekehrt waren. Die russische Seite, wie diese Sitzung stattgefunden hat, ist selbst die größte Bestätigung, dass die russischen Mitarbeiter in der Zentralverwaltung in Karlsruhe am 13. März 1953 am Nachmittag selbst aus dem Urlaub zurückgekehrt waren.

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FROM Chief, EE

SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Pictures of Mischa WOLFREFS: A. BRLE
B. DIR

6/34

ACTION REQUIRED: Verification of Identification per Paragraph 3 below.

1. Forwarded herewith are 3 copies of a blow-up picture of Mischa WOLF, which has been identified by [redacted] as a picture of a person representative attending the Nuremberg trials in 1945-46. This picture was found by supplying a brief description of WOLF to an expert in the National Archives and selected 16 pictures showing persons possibly identifiable as WOLF. These pictures were sent to [redacted] and that the attached picture is without a doubt Mischa WOLF, born [redacted] the age of 22-23.

2. In addition to identifying the picture, [redacted] supplied the following information about WOLF which may aid in making positive identifications. The picture shows WOLF wearing his hair combed back and fuller than known to [redacted] circa 1953. [redacted] states that WOLF did not always wear glasses, although the picture shows ear-rings indicated in the picture is typical of WOLF. [redacted] WOLF should be about 35 to present; height 5'10"; weight 160 lbs; [redacted] built; long face and long nose with a slight hump (characteristic of [redacted] slightly bent) although this [redacted] probably from wearing glasses. [redacted] eyes, nearly dark brown. Both eyes are not exactly in line, that is, [redacted] say, he is slightly cross-eyed, however, one does not always notice this. [redacted] Dark-brown, almost black hair, with a part. His mouth is rather [redacted] not abnormal. His manner is sometimes rather casual, even aloof, but result his hair often hangs in his face and is uncombed. He speaks clearly and intelligently. [redacted] has never seen him really excited, although it is [redacted] opinion that he is probably more lively and energetic than indicated. He does not always exercise 100% self-control. He often left materials lying on his desk and in his room, even open [redacted]

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the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 2/23/95

WRP

5-1

Robert KORB told [redacted] once, before WOLF became head of the INF, that WOLF still had a great deal to learn, because he was too irresponsible. WOLF wears dark horn-rimmed glasses, and he was often seen by [redacted] without glasses. In general, he makes a pleasant and intelligent impression. For example, there is no comparison between WOLF and STUBB. [redacted] believes also that he would not be brutal, but sensitive. [redacted] told [redacted] that as a result of the Nazi rise to power, he left Germany with his father and went to the Soviet Union, where he received his schooling and higher education. He is married and, according to [redacted], must have a very nice wife to whom he was quite attached. She should have one or two children. [redacted] does not know whether he was married in Germany or in the Soviet Union. According to comments which he made, he did not always enjoy his stay in the USSR. [redacted] does not know what it might be, but something appeared to be bothering him in this respect. (Note: His wife's mother was imprisoned for a long time in the Soviet Union in the 1930's). WOLF's facial make-up does not appear to be totally German. It could be that he is Jewish. This is particularly evident in his brown eyes and black-brown hair, as well as his nose and mouth.

In 1953 WOLF drove a small Soviet automobile, which was probably a 1952 model.

Anton ACKERMANN told [redacted] a great deal of WOLF, and so did the Germans according to [redacted]. Paul HICKER told [redacted]. However, the [redacted] UERICH was not in favor of his appointment as head of the INF. [redacted] and the Russians, however, were able to overrule UERICH. He was known in the INF as "Gennose Mische".

3. In addition to the above picture and identifying data from [redacted] we are sending two sets of 4 pictures each of other persons who, according to [redacted] are not WOLF, but also attended the Nuremberg trials. These may be used to bury WOLF's picture when testing [redacted] and [redacted] for further identification of present and past activities of WOLF.

9 April 1957

2 - Attachment:

1. Picture of WOLF
2. Sets of 4 pictures of other persons who attended Nuremberg trials.

Distribution:

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D Markus Johannes WOLF

6/29

Chronology

19 January 1923, Markus Johannes WOLF was born in Hechingen, Wuertemberg. His father was Dr. (of medicine) and author Friedrich WOLF, born 23 December 1885 and 5 October 1955 in Lohndorf, Oranienburg. Friedrich WOLF was a well-known Communist and East Germany's first post-war ambassador to Poland. Markus' mother and Friedrich's second wife was Klara, born 10 May 1891.

(undated) Markus and his brother moved from Hechingen to Germany to Berlin in November 1933. He moved to Moscow in March 1934.

March 1934, Hechingen and moved to the USSR.

1941-1942, Markus WOLF worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force.

1942, Hechingen, Germany. Markus WOLF was born in Hechingen, Germany. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force.

1942-1943, Markus WOLF worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force. He was a pilot and worked in the German Air Force.

1944. WOLF married Emma, nee STENZER, in Moscow. She was born on 21 October 1923 in Munich but, like her husband, had become a Soviet citizen. Her mother was imprisoned in the USSR for a long time, but no further information is now available. Her father was a minor KPD functionary. He may well have been the Franz STENZER who appears in footnote 8, pp. 102-103 of : : KPJ von 1933 bis 1945; Horst Duhake, Klepenheuer U. Witsch, Cologne, 1972. LEONHARD, cited above, says (p. 467) that WOLF married "Emma STENZER, the blonde, blue-eyed girl from the Comintern school . . . who had reported my remarks to the school supervisor" The STENZER girl, whose father was murdered by the Nazis, used the cover name STERN at the Comintern school.

Late May 1945. WOLF and his wife arrived in Berlin. He appeared in the uniform of a Russian colonel and wore a uniform when traveling, although he usually wore civvies. They moved into an apartment at Bayernallee 44, Berlin/Charlottenburg, in the American sector and near the communist-dominated Berliner Rundfunk (radio station). They lived at this address from 23 June 1945 to 15 November 1949. They were Soviet citizens and hence were not subject to German registration laws. Neither did they need food ration cards.

19 November 1945. WOLF went to Nuremberg to serve as an assistant to Prosecutor General Roman Andreyevich RUDENKO, the chief Soviet prosecutor, and as a special reporter. He remained at Nuremberg or went there periodically until early 1946.

28 June 1946. The WOLF's first son was born in Berlin/Charlottenburg. They may have had two other children. The first son was named Michael.

Ca. 1946. LEONHARD (p. 467) wrote, "Upon my return [to Germany] I visited my former friend Mischa WOLF, whom I had known in the Comintern school. He was now commentator on foreign policy for the East Berlin radio and was using the name Michael STORM. . . . Mischa, who had excellent relations with the highest Soviet officials, lived in a luxurious five-room apartment in Bayernallee. . . ." By August 1947 WOLF also owned a fine villa near Lake Glienicke.

All manuscripts prepared for use by Radio Berlin had to be countersigned by WOLF. He also edited all interviews.

April 1948. By this time WOLF had become a member of the SED, the East German Communist Party. In April 1948 he travelled to Poland as a member of the first delegation of East German journalists to go there. In June 1948 he was in Prague, working as a reporter.

16 October 1949 - 1952. The East German government announced the appointment of Markus WOLF as first councillor (Erste Missionarat) to the first East German mission in Moscow. His primary duties, however, were those of a cultural and press attache. During this period he was also given basic training in intelligence. While Markus was in Moscow, his father Friedrich served as the chief of the first East German mission to Poland.

August 1951. Markus WOLF returned on a visit to Berlin to attend a conference of chiefs of DDR diplomatic missions.

1952. WOLF returned from Moscow and joined the Institut fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung (IWF, Institute for Economic and Scientific Research), a cover organization for East German (and hence Soviet) espionage. It had its headquarters in East Berlin at Klosterstr. 59. In late 1952 WOLF, not yet 30 years old, succeeded Anton ACKERMANN as chief of the IWF. ACKERMANN had had a nervous breakdown. Walter ULBRICHT opposed WOLF's appointment, but the Soviets rode down ULBRICHT's objections. WOLF worked closely with Gustav SZENDA in setting up Abteilung (Section) I a, which had as its mission the penetration of the West German government, specifically including the police and the judiciary. At this time WOLF lived at Heinrich Mann Platz 16 (probably Pankow).

1953. An IWF official defected, and the IWF was disbanded. WOLF, by now a brigadier general, became chief of Department XV of the MfS (Ministry of State Security). His mission was unchanged.

1957. By this date WOLF, still chief of Department XV, was also a deputy Minister of the MfS.

December 1958. WOLF participated in a conference in Moscow, attended by Soviets and Poles.

June 1960. By this time WOLF was the chief of the HVA (Hauptverwaltung A) of the MfS. The HVA is charged with conducting foreign intelligence. With a Polish intelligence officer he discussed the organization of aid for Cuba. He also discussed, with UB staff members, operations against the Irish.

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CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SC
CD NO.

COUNTRY East Germany
SUBJECT The Supply and Distribution of Foodstuffs

DATE DISTR. 3 December 1952
NO OF PAGES 8

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany, Frankfurt-HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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SOURCE Untested, through a usually reliable channel.

- The entire supply and distribution of foodstuffs for the DM is directed by a central office, the Main Department for Provisioning (Hauptabteilung Versorgung), which is headed by Prof. Dr. Carl Ritter and is part of the State Planning Commission. The main department fixes the ration card amount and the special foodstuff allotments for the sundry consumer groups and is alone responsible for pertinent legislation. The executive organ for the main department is the Ministry for Trade and Supply. This ministry determines the distribution to the sundry states and Kreise according to the number of nationalized and private farms. The ministry also sees that quotas are fulfilled.
- The State Secretariat for Control and Purchasing of Agricultural Products (Staatssekretariat für Erfassung und Aufkauf landwirtschaftlicher Erzeugnisse), headed by State Secretary Hermann Streit, to which the Unions of Nationalized Control and Purchasing Enterprises (Vereinigungen Volkseigener Erfassungs- und Aufkaufsbetriebe) (VVEAB) are subordinate, and the State Secretariat for the Food Industries (Staatssekretariat für Nahrungs- und Genussmittelindustrie), headed by State Secretary Rudolf Allrecht, which also is responsible for the most economical processing of agricultural products, are independent executive organs.
- The DHZ Internal Reserve is responsible for the execution of orders issued by the DDR cabinet and by the SED to build up the state reserves. The DHZ does not control the state reserve depot for foodstuffs but merely administers it.
- The priority for the distribution of home-produced and imported foodstuffs is assigned as follows:
 - Red Army in the Russian Zone (GSOV)
 - State reserve
 - Export and reparations
 - Privileged circles (party and government functionaries, working intelligentsia)

CLASSIFICATION											
STATE	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY

e. General population

5. The supplying of the distribution points is done in the following order:

a. the HO

b. the "Konsum" (consumer cooperative).

c. private business

The wholesale trade is conducted by the DHZ Foodstuffs in accordance with directives of the Main Department for Provisioning of the State Planning Commission.

6. In spite of the strenuous efforts of and the large investment of money by the DDR government, the planned peacetime agricultural yield per hectare has not yet been reached. In 1951, 142,500,000 east marks were invested, of which 26,800,000 was spent for improvements and 38,400,000 for machine lending stations (HAF). The plan for 1952 calls for an investment of 184,300,000 east marks, of which 63,700,000 is for the construction of 45 machine lending stations. The machine lending stations are being expanded considerably. This is attributable to a dearth of draft animals and to the great strategic importance of the HAF.

7. The DDR balance sheet for supply and distribution in 1951 showing imports and home-grown foodstuffs is as follows. The amounts are in tons.

Product	Home-grown	Imported	Total 1951
Meat	582,600	79,500	662,100
Fish	84,200	62,000	146,200
Animal fats	48,700	36,200	84,900
Butter	76,600	32,300	108,900
Oil	54,200	16,200	70,400
Flour	1,246,100	346,000	1,592,100
Sugar	807,800	-	807,800
Potatoes	4,726,300	86,500	4,812,800

8. The following is the 1955 plan for foodstuffs in the DDR according to records of the State Planning Commission. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Product	Production	Import	Total
Meat	924	26	950
Fish	212	74	286
Animal fats	245	-	245
Butter	100	28	128
Oil	88	17	105
Flour	1,900	-	1,900
Sugar	888	-	888
Potatoes	17,000	-	17,000

In 1951, foodstuffs were imported in part from the free world, but by 1953-1954 it is expected to import such items only from the East Bloc states.

9. The total supply of foodstuffs consists of inventories at the beginning of the year in processing plants, enterprises, and dealers' stocks, and also of production and imports. The distribution of the total supply is made in accordance with a priority schedule set up by the SED economic planning commission in early 1949. Since the middle of 1951, this distribution of the state reserve (called the plan reserve in official terminology) has assumed greater importance.

The priority schedule is as follows:

- a. Quota bearers (Kontingenträger)
- b. Reparations
- c. GSOV
- d. Export
- ✓ e. Plan reserve
- ✓ f. Material reserve
- c. Inventory 31 December 1951

10. In 1951, the foodstuffs were distributed to the "quota bearers" - that is, the DDR population, as follows. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Meat	434.6
Fish	103.9
Animal fats	60.8
Butter	72.4
Oil	39.6
Flour	1,080.9
Sugar	423.9
Potatoes	3,413.2

True distribution figures cannot be arrived at from these amounts because the differentiation in the distribution to the population is too great. There are three groups supplied in the DDR: party and government functionaries, the RO, the AG and VES plant cafeterias, and the normal starving section of the population. Moreover substitutes are supplied to the third category in place of the meat and fat rations found on the ration cards.

11. In 1951, the foodstuffs were exported and delivered as reparations as follows (The amounts are in thousands of tons):

Product	Export	Reparations	Total
Meat	3.8	-	3.8
Fish	2.4	-	2.4
Animal fats	-	-	-
Butter	-	-	-
Flour	62.4	-	62.4
Sugar	104.3	82.7	187.0
Potatoes	426.3	134.2	560.5

The amounts under sugar reparations were not sent to the USSR but were used by the Russians in barter dealings with the West. The potatoes delivered as exports and reparations were mostly seed potatoes or were used to make up for poor harvests (in this case Poland).

12. In 1951, the foodstuffs were delivered to the Russian army as follows. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Meat	96.7
Fish	18.6
Animal fats	8.6
Butter	28.4
Oil	3.1
Flour	275.2
Sugar	76.4
Potatoes	604.5

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13. If part of the foodstuffs delivered to the Russian army in the Russian Zone exceed the requirements of the several troop units, it is sold to regional Russian zone authorities, or sales cooperatives (Konsum and HO). Other foods or consumer goods are purchased with the proceeds. The deliveries to the GSNV are credited as occupation costs.

14. Material reserves in the Russian Zone refer to those foodstuffs which are stored for further processing. As of the end of 1951 the material reserves in the plants were on hand in the following amounts. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Meat	22.5
Fish	-
Animal fats	2.4
Butter	-
Oil	7.4
Flour	46.2
Sugar	35.7
Potatoes	158.7 (mainly for processing into potato starches and dried potatoes)

15. The state reserve of foodstuffs, officially designated the plan-reserve, is subordinate to the DDR cabinet and the GCO. Some state reserve depots are under the People's Police. The state reserves can only be used by permission of the DDR cabinet, the GCO, or the People's Police.

16. The can containers necessary for the storing of foodstuffs are given production priority. The iron industry must give priority to the rolling of the needed strips and sheets. The following allocation of the sheet for tin can production was made in 1951. The amounts are in tons.

State reserve	7,240
Reparations	1,950
Civilian requirement	1,080
Export	2,160
Total	12,430

A total production of 18,700 tons is planned for 1952.

SAG Thale/Harz, the VEB Kaltwalzwerk Bad Salzungen, and the VEB Kaltwalzwerk Oranienburg are producing the sheet for the most part.

17. In 1951, the following foodstuffs were stored in the state reserve. The amounts are in tons.

Meat	108.5
Fish	22.0
Animal fats	11.0
Butter	8.2
Oil	18.6
Flour	203.5
Sugar	115.0

In addition 8,500 tons of dried potatoes were stored.

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18. The following is a list of the principal state reserve storage depots.

Place	Product Stored	First Quarter 1952, Amounts in Tons	Maximum Capacity in Tons
Eastock-Marlenehe	Fish, canned	4,250	6,700
Reitziel-Marne	Grain	18,700	40 -43,000
Sasquitz-Lanoken	Fish, canned	8,700	11,300
Lauterbach on Rügen	Fish, canned	13,200	15 -18,000
Mursen/Saxony	Flour	32,650	40,000
Prötzelshöhe	Butter	1,760	4 - 5,000
Oschata/Saxony, right by Southern Railroad	Flour	17,000	4 -21,000
Line Mursen-Miesa	Meat	6,400	7 - 7,500
Dresden, Harbor basin SSW	Fats	2,135	3,650
from Wettinerstr. railroad station	Fats and oils	7,630	11 -13,000
Magdeburg, Lieb- knechtstr.	Butter and other Fats	2,840	4 - 6,000
Burg, northwest of the railroad station near the Thälmann	Sugar	7,360	12,000
Applau/Neckburg	Dried potatoes	2,500	
Mutakusterstr.	Oil and animal fats	4,520	6,300
Witten/Brandenburg, Berlinerstrasse	Sugar	21,600	25 -26,000
Gotha/Thuringia Pari strasse	Butter	3,725	5,800
Neuklen/Saxony	Meat	24,250	30 -32,000
Zuckerfabrikstr.	Meat	17,300	30,000
Chernitz, Alt Chernitzerstr.	Oil and animal fats	15,200	19 -21,000
Lins/Saxony	Butter	2,870	7,500
Ankersleben- Bf. Nord	Sugar	42,700	50,000
Riesa/Saxony	Sugar	20,360	26,400
Eastock, Werristr.	Meat	21,200	40 -45,000
Dessau, August-Bebel- strasse	Grain	14,200	20 -25,000
Genthin/Saxony-Anhalt	Meat	6,240	6,500 - 7,000
Dresden-Stockyard	Meat	8,530	11 -14,000
Ostberlin, Bahala	Meat	7,200	9 -10,000
Osthafen, near the Harschauer Brücke	Meat	8,560	10 -11,000
Zwickau-Eckersbach	Meat	11,750	14,600
Leipzig-William	Sugar	2,760	3,200
Ostberlin	Sugar	4,200	5 - 7,000
Slaughterhouse	Sugar	7,460	9 -11,000
Erfurt-railroad station area	Sugar	5,240	8 -10,000
Halle-Frotha	Sugar	2,820	10 -11,000
Alisleben/Saxony- Anhalt	Sugar	4,600	4,600
Crottewitz near Liebenwerda			
Halle, Raffinerie- strasse			
Magdeburg-Sudenburg			
Zeitz/Saxony- Anhalt			
Positz/Thuringia			

19. The following is a list of newly constructed cold storage plants.

Berlin, slaughterhouse	2,300 ton capacity for meat
Frankfurt/Oder freight station area	4,000 ton capacity for meat and fat
Dresden-Trachau	3,150 ton capacity for butter, fats, meat, and eggs

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Prenslan at the corner of 109
and 198 streets

2,800 ton capacity for meat
and fats

These cold storage plants are for the use of the People's Police exclusively
and are managed by it.

20. The following are 1951 balance sheets for supply and distribution. The
amounts are in thousands of tons.

a. Supply of Meat		
Inventory 1 January 1951		12.4
Production		582.6
Import from USSR	46.4	
elsewhere	33.1	79.5
		674.5
Distribution of Meat		
Quota bearers	434.6	
Reparations	-	
GSOV	96.7	
Export	3.8	
Plan reserve	108.5	
Material reserve	22.5	
Inventory 31 December 1951	8.4	
	674.5	
b. Supply of Fish		
Inventory 1 January 1951	6.8	
Production	84.2	
Import from USSR	8.8	
elsewhere	53.2	62.0
		153.0
Distribution of Fish		
Quota bearers	103.9	
Reparations	-	
GSOV	18.6	
Export	2.4	
Plan reserve	22.0	
Material reserve	-	
Inventory 31 December 1951	6.1	
	153.0	
c. Supply of Animal Fats		
Inventory 1 January 1951	3.5	
Production	48.7	
Import from USSR	24.1	
elsewhere	12.1	36.2
		88.4
Distribution of Animal Fats		
Quota bearers	60.8	
Reparations	-	
GSOV	8.6	
Export	-	
Plan reserve	11.0	
Material reserve	2.4	
Inventory 31 December 1951	1.6	
	88.4	
d. Supply of Butter		
Inventory 1 January 1951	4.6	
Production	76.6	
Import from USSR	26.1	
elsewhere	6.2	32.3
		113.5

IV-10: (Continued)

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Distribution of Butter			
Quota bearers			72.4
Reparations			-
GSOV			28.4
Export			-
Plan reserve			8.2
Material reserve			-
Inventory 31 December 1951			<u>4.5</u>
			113.5
e. Supply of Oil			
Inventory 1 January 1951			5.1
Production			54.2
Import from USSR	12.7		
elsewhere	<u>3.5</u>		<u>16.2</u>
			75.5
Distribution of Oil			
Quota bearers			39.6
Reparations			-
GSOV			311
Export			-
Plan reserve			18.6
Material reserve			7.4
Inventory 31 December 1951			<u>6.8</u>
			75.5
f. Supply of Flour			
Inventory 1 January 1951			183.5
Production			1,246.1
Import from USSR	297.5		
elsewhere	<u>48.5</u>		<u>346.0</u>
			1,775.6
Distribution of Flour			
Quota bearers			1,080.9
Reparations			-
GSOV			275.2
Export			62.4
Plan reserve			203.5
Material reserve			46.2
Inventory 31 December 1951			<u>107.4</u>
			1,775.6
g. Supply of Sugar			
Inventory 1 January 1951			112.4
Production			807.8
Import			-
			<u>920.2</u>
Distribution of Sugar			
Quota bearers			423.9
Reparations			82.7
GSOV			76.4
Export			104.3
Plan reserve			115.0
Material reserve			35.7
Inventory 31 December 1951			<u>82.2</u>
			920.2
h. Supply of Potatoes			
Inventory 1 January 1951			107.5
Production			4,726.3
Import from USSR			-
elsewhere	86.5		<u>86.5</u>
			4,920.3

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Distribution of Potatoes	
Quota bearers	3,413.2
Reparations	134.2
GSOV	604.5
Export	426.3
Plan reserve	
Material reserve	158.7
Inventory 31 December 1951	<u>181.4</u>
	4,920.3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 50
CD NO. ✓

COUNTRY East Germany **7113**
SUBJECT Establishment of Farm Cooperatives
PLACE ACQUIRED Germany, Munich *This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.*
DATE OF INFO. 9 August 1952

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- At a conference of chief editors held in the office of the Central Committee of the SED on 7 August 1952 Albert Schaefer, a member of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee, stated that more than 100 cooperative farms had been established and that several hundred organizational committees were working on the establishment of more such farms. Schaefer said that many of the people still believe that there is a difference between these cooperative farms and the collectivization of farming. This opinion must not be attacked in the East German press. However, the party must be aware that this opinion is erroneous and that the same development is now taking place in East Germany that took place in the U.S.S.R. in 1927. According to Schaefer, the only difference between conditions which existed in the U.S.S.R. in 1927 and those prevailing now in East Germany lies in the fact that farmland in the U.S.S.R. was nationalized prior to collectivization whereas in Germany it will be nationalized only in the normal course of the collectivization. In this connection Schaefer denounced Slansky who had stressed the national form of farm cooperatives which had been organized in Czechoslovakia.
- In addition, Schaefer made the following statements:
Meetings, which envisage the establishment of farm cooperatives, must be approved by the Kreisrat, which will screen the members of the founding committee. Access to these meetings will be only by invitation. In several cases, expropriated farmers of large estates tried to become members of the executive board of farm cooperatives. No farmers of large estates or innkeepers must be admitted to meetings held in connection with the organization of farm cooperatives even though they be members of the SED. All the members of farm cooperatives will have the same standing. The wives of the farmers must also acquire membership. There will be no hired farm hands in the cooperatives. Former farm workers, who became cooperative farmers, ceased to be members of the Union of Farm Workers within the FDGB. The former property of farmers, who were expropriated in the border zone for political reasons, became state property. Farm workers, who were put on these farms, had to turn over their property to the farm cooperatives except for some livestock. Taking workers previously employed by farmers of large estates members of farm cooperatives represents political progress and a set-back for capitalism in the country. On the other hand, farm

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- 2 -

hands of nationalized estates must not become cooperative farmers, as this would mean a step in the wrong direction. The shortage of labor in the country must not be discussed in the press, as this is an argument put forth by the enemies of the working class. By a mechanization of farming methods, it will become possible to release even more farm workers for industrial production.

3. NRD cadres will have to be formed in farm cooperatives. However, they should become active only after a certain stabilisation period. Committees of women are also to be organized. They should assume their activities without delay, as clergymen oppose the farm cooperatives from their pulpits and try to influence the farmers' wives especially.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7/13
INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	East Germany for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of SED, the Central Intelligence Agency.	REPORT NO.	CS
SUBJECT		DATE DISTR.	4 March 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	10 February 1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Germany, Munich	REFERENCES	

REFERENCES

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Unidentified source (F); supposedly based on a copy of the directive.
Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. The Politburo of the SED issued a directive to the East German press on 10 February 1953, giving the following instructions:
 - a. Refugees fleeing from East Germany are to be described as "fugitives from the Republic (republikflüchtige)". Only in exceptional cases is the term "deserter (Ueberläufer)" to be applied.
 - b. Propaganda for the return of the refugees is to be increased.
 - c. Particular emphasis is to be placed on the danger facing young male refugees that upon their arrival in the West they may be shanghaied by the French Foreign Legion.
2. The directive declared that the fact that every such person returning to East Germany is immediately arrested and confined for a period varying from two weeks to three months must be kept quiet. This imprisonment is considered to be for "re-educational purposes", while allowing sufficient time for an investigation of the person's activities during his stay in the West. In case of acquittal, the confinement is to be regarded as a police punishment for failure to register the change of address with the local police.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
24 November 1956

250

TO : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Soviet Interference with Berlin Rail Access

The Soviet commander at the East German check point at Marienborn has informed the British that Soviet authorities intend to start exercising their "right" to board Allied trains running between Berlin and West Germany on the night of 25-26 November. Another threat to start boarding trains on the night of 23-24 November apparently was not carried out.

Colonel Kotsiuba, the Soviet acting commandant in Berlin, asserted on 22 November it would be necessary for Soviet authorities to board trains in order to inspect passengers' documentation. He also asserted the Soviet right to pass judgment on whether specific individuals should be authorized to travel under orders issued by Allied authorities. These are the two major points of Soviet-Allied disagreement.

Allied officials in Bonn decided on 24 November to send a further protest to Colonel Kotsiuba, stating that Allied train commanders would not permit Soviet authorities to board the trains. On 24 November the Allied ambassadors agreed that trains should turn back rather than permit Soviet authorities to board them or take off passengers.

Soviet authorities appear to be testing Allied reaction to pressure, and may impose further restrictions on surface travel if successful at this. They claim that persons have been traveling on military trains, and under military orders on the autobahn, who are unauthorized because they are not directly connected with the military garrison in Berlin, while the Allies claim the sole authority to decide who has such travel rights.

If the Soviet authorities do not yield and the Allies are forced to send trains back to prevent their being boarded, the Allies might find themselves maneuvered into becoming the victims of a self-imposed partial blockade of Berlin.



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